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SUMMARY
This thesis studies the interaction between environmental regulations/agreements
and international bilateral trade performance. The pollution haven hypothesis states
that stringent environmental policies may drive the dirty industries to the countries
with less stringent regulations. This paper verifies the pollution haven hypothesis
from three different aspects, international trade flow and foreign direct investment
flow changes caused by the European Union Emission Trading Scheme and the gen-
eral effects of all types of environmental regulations on country level bilateral trade
flows.
In this thesis, I investigate and verify pollution haven hypothesis with panel re-
gressions with industry and country level data. I show that imports will increase for
European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) members for dirty industries
while exports decrease. The changed pattern for two way trade flows follows the En-
vironmental Kuznet Curve. Also, EU ETS changes firms’ foreign direct investment
decisions. According to my theoretical model, both inward and outward foreign direct
investment on dirty industries decrease for EU ETS members. This result is confirmed
by an empirical study with panel data. Under uniform distribution of freely allocated
allowances, efficient firms are driven out of the market. In the last chapter, I show a
more general conclusion that the presence of any type of multilateral environmental




It is well known that there is a U-shaped bilateral relationship between pollution per
capita and income, called the environmental Kuznet Curve. One possible explanation
for this relationship is given by the Pollution Haven Hypothesis. The pollution haven
hypothesis, or pollution haven effect, is the idea that polluting industries will relocate
to jurisdictions with less stringent environmental regulations. From the point of view
of firms and industries stringent environmental regulations are considered a threat to
their international competitiveness because pollution abatement significantly increas-
es production costs. According to Michael Greenstone (2002, JPE), in the first 15
years in which the Clean Air Act was in force (1972-87), nonattainment counties (rel-
ative to attainment ones) lost approximately 590,000 jobs, 37 billion in capital stock,
and 75 billion (1987 dollars) of output in pollution-intensive industries. According to
international trade theories, comparative advantage and the Hecksher-Ohilin-Vanek
(HOV) model, the strictness of environmental regulations is related to the exports of
polluting industries. Second, besides the trade pattern shifts, the structure of indus-
tries could be also affected since the pollution-intensive industries will be forced to
relocate to less strictly regulated regions. Extensive industrial migration to foreign
countries can cause unemployment and undermine the balance of trade. Moreover,
free trade agreements that may improve the mobility of capital can accelerate this
trend.
In the past few decades, many countries recognized the importance of environ-
mental protection. Various environmental regulations have been adopted in order to
limit the emission of pollutants and to protect the ecology and species. The concern
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related to the pollution haven hypothesis is that governments will engage in inefficient
competition to attract polluting industries by weakening their environmental stan-
dards. A welfare-maximizing government should set standards so that the benefits
justify the costs at the margin. Jurisdictions have different assimilative capacities,
costs of abatement, and values regarding the environment. So heterogeneity in pollu-
tion standards is to be expected, and by extension industry migration to less stringent
jurisdictions does not necessarily raise efficiency concerns. Another concern is that
trade liberalization might lead to a “rate to the bottom” in standards as countries
weaken their environmental policy in response to the competitive pressures of freer
trade (Copleland and Taylor, 2004).
Thus, in this thesis, I investigate pollution haven hypothesis from all three as-
pects mentioned above. In the first chapter, how the environmental regulations, in
particular, European Union Emission Trading Scheme affects bilateral trade flows for
regulated industries. My empirical results shows significant effect of a pollution haven
generated by European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The inflow trade
volumes increase and the outflow decreases in member countries. The second chapter
studies the other possible consequence of pollution haven, the change in foreign direct
investment (FDI) as a result of newly introduced environmental policy with a theo-
retical model considering both trade flows and FDI flows. Different from previous two
chapter, in order to learn how the presences of all kinds of environmental agreements
interacting with multilateral trade agreements. Instead of a focus on a single environ-
mental agreement, I include all types of multilateral environmental agreements under
different subjects to investigate the effects of international environmental agreements
with free trade agreements simultaneously.
In the first two chapters, I investigate the pollution haven generated by EU ETS.
There are several reasons for investigating the EUETS. The most important reason is
the crucial ecology problem caused by global climate change. Global warming caused
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by the emissions of greenhouse gas, has been studied broadly since the end of the last
century. Gradually increasing global temperatures have the potential to harm entire
ecological systems. Aiming to slow down global warming, the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) announced the Kyoto Protocol in
1995 and it entered into force in 2005. Led by the Kyoto Protocol, EU ETS was es-
tablished in 2005. Operated by the European Commission, it is the largest emissions
trading scheme in the world. It is proceeding until 2020 and is adjusted according
to its performance, including emission goals and changes in industrial structures as
the system evolves. How and whether those proposed adjustments will be conducted
depends on the influence and effectiveness of the current policy. The second reason
of picking EU ETS is the special properties of global pollutants. The restrictions on
carbon emissions may lead to carbon leakage and free riders. Carbon leakage and free
rider could weaken the benefit to the environment though the cost remains the same.
Hence, looking for a balance between the regulation and international competitiveness
is much more important for global pollutants. The third reason is the multinational
trading scheme of EU ETS. It seems that the trading scheme with initial allocation
as a lump sum transfer. It should have no distortion effects on firms’ behavior even
with uneven initial allocations. Thus, the effects of EU ETS on international trade
flows and FDI decisions are not clear.
If pollution haven hypothesis holds, we could expect that countries’ comparative
advantage changes as a result of abatement cost of environmental regulations. The
regulated countries may import more “dirty industry goods” from unregulated coun-
tries while export less. Or on the other side, regulated countries may have their dirty
industries relocated to foreign countries without or with less stringent environmental
regulations. To study this effect, my thesis starts with the effects on bilateral trade
flows in the first chapter. I show that EU ETS impedes regulated industries in in-
ternational competition by decreasing exports and increasing imports. This result
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confirmed the pollution haven hypothesis of EU ETS.
The second chapter focuses more on foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI, which
has been shown as a substitution for bilateral trade (Markusen 2002), also has an
important role in international competition. Given the intra-industry trade flows
change, how firms’ FDI decisions change after the implementation of EU ETS is
an important issue to further verify the pollution haven hypothesis. According to
Xing and Kolstad (2000), if environmental regulations generate distortions in the
operation of polluting industries, the multinational enterprise may initially respond
with the intra-firm transfer of its production facility, or it may increase the investment
in its subsidiaries located in the country with lenient regulation. These adjustments
plus relocation of entire plants will change FDI flows. Moreover, since EU ETS is a
relatively new launched regulation scheme, firms may not be able to make relocation
decisions in the short run. Thus, FDI is a great indicator to test the pollution haven
hypothesis.
The third part of my thesis focuses on the presence of international environmental
agreements. Different from the previous two chapters and current literature that
focus on a single environmental agreement or regulation, my data covers all types of
environmental agreements, including pollution regulations on air and marine, species,
natural resources and habitant protections and energy. The importance of studying
ex- and post- effects lies on the self-selections of the member countries. It seems
that signing multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) with international trade
partners could eliminate the disadvantage in international competitions caused by
stringent environmental regulations. Voluntary participation on MEAs is similar
to trade liberalization realized by free trade agreements (FTA). The most widely
used model to study the ex post effects of trade related policies is gravity equation.
According to Baier and Bergstrand (2007) “the gravity equation is typically used to
explain cross-sectional variation in country pairs’ trade flows in term of the countries’
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incomes, bilateral distance, and dummy variables for common languages, for common
land borders, and for the presence of absences of an FTA.” However, researchers
believe that participation of environmental and trade agreements are endogenous and
also determined by some unobserved heteroskedasticity of bilateral countries. Thus,
an OLS regression could be biased. In this chapter, I adopt several methods and
adjustment on cross-sectional gravity equations as well as panel regressions treated
with various fixed effects.
My thesis distinguishes from the current literature in several perspectives. In the
first two chapters, unlike most of the early research which focuses on local pollutants,
I study the pollution haven effect caused by EU ETS, a cross country regulation
focusing on a global pollutant, carbon dioxide. The efficiency of an environmental
policy requires that the benefit to the environment equals the cost of regulation. Ad-
ditionally, the effect of EU ETS is a two-sided sword, since it could either benefit the
regulated industries or impede them depending on the allocated pollution allowance.
EU ETS is a long-term adjustable environmental regulation. Understanding the effect
of current policies is necessary for further improvement. To deal with the endogeneity
of the amount of freely allocated allowances, I apply moments of heteroscedasticity
to instrument freely allocated allowances (Lewbel, 2012) in my study. When I inves-
tigate the FDI flow changes, rather than focusing only on FDI, my model consists of
both FDI and international trade flows that are taken as substitutes. The inclusion
of both could give a clearer understanding of the effect of EU ETS and whether it
generates a pollution haven effect or not. In order to explain how the flows change
and substitute for each other, the endogenous determination of the number of firms,
firms’ efficiency, and entry and exit are introduced into the model as well.
The third chapter1 begins to generate a more general conclusion about pollution
haven. In order to obtain a complimentary data, I use International Environmental
1This chapter is co-worked with Dr. Tibor Besedes, Xinping Tian, and Jianqiu Wang.
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Agreements (IEA) Database Project by Ronald B. Mitchell and the IEA Database
Project, 2002-2014. This truly systematic, comprehensive and up to date list of
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) include not only the agreements that
counter the pollution but also the agreements that aim to preserve the ecology and
species. Another contribution of this part is to solve the possible endogeneity. In
addition, our data keep a track for the total numbers of MEAs, MEAs with differ-
ent subjects or with the same lineage. Our date could provide us more a detailed
estimation for the effects of MEAs on international trade flows in future studies.
In general, my thesis proves the existence of pollution haven generated by en-
vironmental policies (regulation, agreements or protocol). I find evidence that en-
vironmental policies decrease bilateral trade flows as well as FDI flows. The first
chapter shows for total trade flows that the effect of EU ETS increases EU imports
and decreases EU exports, indicating that EU ETS has caused a deterioration in EU’s
comparative advantage. In particular, those countries in short positions suffer more
from EU ETS. For some industries in which there are excessive allocations, such as
glasses, pottery and ceramics, the total effects of EU ETS is to increase imports while
decrease exports. It provides us a political suggestion that further emission cuts could
be applied on them. The amount of freely allocated allowances shift trade flows sig-
nificantly, and their directions are predictable. Thus, the social planner could adjust
firms’ emissions and productions through controlling their free allocated allowance.
The second indicator of pollution haven – FDI also decreases after EU ETS. My
theoretical model suggests that both inward and outward FDI flows decrease after EU
ETS. But these empirical results are statistically insignificant. The theoretical model
suggests that output for regulated firms is lower than that of unregulated firms given
the same productivity. If two different regulated firms are under a uniform freely
allocated allowances scheme, the more efficient one is more likely to exit the market.
It is plausible that EU ETS will not only decrease FDI inward flows because of the
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higher cost of regulation, but also decreases FDI outward flows because efficient firms
are driven out of the market.
The general evaluation of environmental agreements also indicates the pollution
haven hypothesis holding. There are significant negative effects on imports of MEAs
and positive effects on imports of free trade agreements (FTAs). Those effects are
consistent with various model setting (including year fixed effect, country fixed effect,
reporter by partner fixed effect etc.). Also, traditional estimates of the MEAs on
international trade flows by using cross-section gravity equation is biased. It overes-
timated the negative effect of MEAs. Another important finding in our work is that
the simultaneous absence of FTAs and MEAs increases the bilateral international
trade a lot and significantly. This result could be well explained by the self-selection
of FTAs and MEAs.
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CHAPTER II
TESTING THE POLLUTION HAVEN HYPOTHESIS:
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME
2.1 Introduction
One of the most important global climate changes, global warming caused by the
emissions of greenhouse gas has been studied broadly since the end of last century.
Gradually increasing global temperatures have the potential to harm entire ecological
systems. Aiming to slow down global warming, the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1995 which
entered into force in 2005. Led by the Kyoto Protocol, European Union Emission-
s Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was established in 2005. Operated by the European
Commission, it is the largest emission trading scheme in the world. It is proceeding
until 2020 and is adjusted according to its performance, including emission goals and
changes in industrial structures as the system evolves. How and whether those pro-
posed adjustments will be conducted depends on the influence and effectiveness of
the current policy.
Generally speaking, EU ETS, like other environmental regulations, generates both
benefits of decrease of emissions and also costs for conducting them. Those effects
could be reflected in international trade. On one side, as a stringent environmental
regulation, EU ETS could impede regulated industries in international competition.
This outcome follows naturally from the pollution haven hypothesis which claims that
pollution control costs are important enough to measurably influence trade and in-
vestment. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model provides theoretical foundation for
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this perspective. Since relative factor endowments associated with pollution control
costs change in regulated countries, the production of pollution-intensive goods may
shift to other countries without emission regulations.
On the other side, EU ETS is a cap-and-trade scheme with its major allowances
freely allocated from its launching point until now. The comparative advantage of
industries that have abundant emission permits and lower abatement costs may in-
crease. Because of those inverse effects, the real influence of current EU ETS policies
on international trade is unclear.
In this chapter I investigate in which direction and by how much the EU ETS shifts
the member countries’ international trade by using bilateral trade data. Recently
researchers have focused on EU ETS itself, that is, how the trading scheme affects
the efficiency of the policy. Convincing evidence of pollution haven hypothesis based
on a global pollutant has not been found, nor has it been fully investigated.
Hintermann (2009) considers the EU ETS impact on the allowance price, finding
evidence that prices were not initially driven by marginal abatement costs. Neuhoffa
et al. (2006) studied how the allocation allowances affect the electricity sector only.
Bruyn et al., (2008) by studying the resulting competitive change examine the pollu-
tion haven effect of EU ETS using data on Dutch industries. They found that there
is an increase in costs as well as a change in the ratios of export to the total value of
domestic production.1 The limitation of their study is their assumption that EU ETS
is under a full auction scenario in which all allowances are auctioned to producers.
However, most allowances so far have been given away freely.
There are several differences between my work in this chapter and the current lit-
erature. First, unlike most of the early research which focuses on local pollutants,2 I
1In this paper, they investigate the cost and export ratio changes separately for each industry.
For example, the aluminium firms face an increase of cost by 5%, the export ratio changed by 76%.
2The toxicity index for the local pollutants depends on the damage to the air, like sulfur dioxide,
poisoned substance to the soil and water. Generally, regulation in one country is less likely to affect
the environment in another country, not considering boundary, wind and precipitation.
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study the pollution haven effect caused by EU ETS, a cross country regulation focus-
ing on a global pollutant, carbon dioxide. The efficiency of an environmental policy
requires that the benefit to the environment equals the cost of regulation. But for a
global pollutant, possible carbon leakage could weaken the benefit to the environment
though the cost remains the same. Moreover, decreasing the greenhouse gas globally
could generate free-riders as well. Hence, the balance between the regulation and
international competitiveness is much more important for global pollutants.
Additionally, the effect of EU ETS is a two-sided sword, since it could either ben-
efit the regulated industries or restrict them depending on the allocated allowance.
As a long-term adjustable environmental regulation, understanding the effect of cur-
rent policies is necessary for their further improvement. Second, this chapter uses
a new panel dataset from 2000 to 2011 that combines detailed regulation data with
bilateral international trade flows, by carefully matching the industry specific allo-
cated allowance with the 2- or 3-digit SITC classification of trade flows. The analysis
is based on the gravity equation. It is well known that the gravity equation may
suffer from endogeneity when evaluating the effect of trade-relevant policies. In this
chapter, I uses fixed effects to capture each country’s characteristics and considering
the uniform standard and enforcement of EU ETS for each. Besides the panel data
regression, I also use the difference-in-difference method.
The plausible endogeneity of the quantity of allocated allowances is controlled
with instruments. Since the national allocation plans which determine the detailed
allocated allowances for each industry also take international trade into account,
this chapter applies moments of heteroscedasticity to instrument for freely allocated
allowances (Lewbel, 2012). This is quite different from the majority of literature that
uses abatement costs to measure the environmental policies and deal with endogeneity.
Empirical results in this chapter suggest several importation policy implications.
As for total trade flows, the pure effect of EU ETS is to increase EU imports and
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decrease EU exports,, indicating that EU ETS has cause a deterioration in EU’s
comparative advantage. I look into the trade flows by separating them into intra
EU and extra EU trade. The effects for EU and non EU countries have the same
trend in imports and exports. The effect on the non EU country is slightly larger
comparing to EU countries. However, due to the larger flows within EU, the pooled
regression coefficients are much closer to intra EU results. Member countries whose
allocated allowances are not enough for production, or whose net emission trade
flows are negative (in short position) do face a larger disadvantage in international
competition.
These results suggest that there is a pollution haven effect caused by the EU
ETS. However, the shift is only within the EU. In particular, those countries in short
positions suffer more from EU ETS. As most reports indicated, there is excessive
allocation for several industries such as glasses, pottery and ceramics. The total effect
of EU ETS on them is to increase imports while decreasing exports. Thus, further
emission cuts should be laid on them. The amount of freely allocated allowances shift
trade flows significantly, and their directions are predictable. Thus, the social planner
could adjust firms’ emissions and productions through controlling their free allocated
allowance.
This chapter is outlined as follows. In section II, I give a short description of
the current literature on the pollution haven hypothesis. In section III, I describe
EU ETS and its possible outcomes in detail. In sections IV and V, the dataset and
methodologies are introduced respectively. In section VI, I discuss the results. Section
VII offers robustness checks. The conclusion follows in section VIII.
2.2 Literature Review
There are numerous studies of the role of environmental regulations on the pattern
of trade, both theoretical and empirical. Siebert (1977), Pethig (1976) and McGuire
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(1982) provide the possible background for pollution haven hypothesis by studying a
two-goods open economy. They all conclude that the environmental policy will in-
crease social welfare if marginal social costs of production are higher than the marginal
utility of consumption. The comparative advantage model implies that a country will
have a production advantage if it has abundant resources.
However, in terms of empirical evidence, researchers have not reached an agree-
ment on whether environmental policy affects trade. Copeland and Taylor (2004)
group empirical studies into pre-1997 and post-1997. The early research mainly re-
lied on cross-sectional data, while the later one uses panel data methods to deal
with possible endogeneity problems. The most widely cited empirical work is Tobey
(1990) in which two methods are used to test the hypothesis that the strictness of
environmental regulations is related to exports of polluting industries. His work fails
to find evidence that domestic environmental regulation has a significant impact on
exports of polluting industries. Only one of the twelve included factor endowments
is significant in three commodity groups. Van Beers and Van Den Bergh (2001) find
no significant effect of environmental policy on exports of dirty goods for resource-
intensive industries using a gravity model. Their result suffers from an endogeneity
problem because of their cross-sectional dataset of 21 OECD countries in a single year
only.
Controlling for endogeneity and heterogeneity using a two-stage least squares ap-
proach, Wilson, Otsuli and Sewadeh (2002) examine whether environmental regula-
tions affect exports of dirty goods in 24 countries from 1994 to 1998. They do find
some evidence that there is some tradeoff between stringent environmental regula-
tions and trade expansion for some industries. Ederington and Minier (2003) use the
environmental abatement cost as the measurement of the stringiness of regulations
and treat it as endogenous in the U.S. from 1978 to 1992. They find the impact of
regulation on the net trade flow is significantly high. Levinson and Taylor (2008)
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develop a theoretical model and test it empirically to examine the effect of environ-
mental regulations on trade flows between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, for 130
manufacturing industries from 1977 to 1986 and that industries hardest hit by regu-
lations experienced the largest increases in net imports. Their main contribution is to
deal with the endogeneity for foreign unobserved regulations by applying instrumental
variables which are generated by weighted state characteristics.
One study that focuses on EU environmental regulations is Cavea and Blomquistb
(2011). They apply the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) index as a measure of pollution
to test the pollution haven that is generated by signing of the Maastricht Treaty in
1993 on EU imports at the 2-digit SITC level from 1970 to 1999. They find no
significant increase in the amount of EU toxic-intensive trade with poorer countries,
although there is some increase in EU imports of toxic goods from poorer OECD and
non-EU European countries, however, this result is not robust. My chapter studies
the subsequent years, from 2000 to 2011 and tests the pollution haven hypothesis
generated by EU ETS for a global pollutant.
2.3 European Union Emission Trading System
EU ETS is the first large emission trading scheme in the world encompassing 27 EU
countries plus Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein and covering more than 10,000 in-
stallations with a net heat excess of 20 MW in energy and industrial sectors, which
are collectively responsible for half of the EUs emissions of carbon dioxide. It was
launched on January, 1, 2005 as an outcome of the Kyoto Protocol. There are three
phases of EU ETS. Phase I ran from January, 1, 2005 to 31st December, 2007 and
covered only carbon dioxide emissions from energy activities (combustion installa-
tions with a rated thermal input exceeding 20MW, mineral oil refineries, coke ovens),
production and processing of ferrous metals, mineral industry (cement clinker, glass
and ceramic bricks) and pulp, paper and board activities. Phase II ran from January,
13
1, 2008 to December, 31, 2012. During this period, EU ETS includes revised moni-
toring and reporting rules, more stringent emissions caps and additional combustion
sources. New industries were included, with airlines industry being added at the
beginning of 2012. Phase III started on 1st January 2013 and will go until Decem-
ber, 31, 2020. This period will bring major changes, such as harmonized allocation
methodologies and inclusion of additional greenhouse gases and emission sources. EU
ETS will be expanded to include petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminum industries
and additional gases in 2013. The cap will be cut by as much as 20% compared to
Phase II.
The distribution of emission allowances also differs across phases. Phase I is based
on historical emissions and installation levels.3 Phase II retains Phase I methodol-
ogy but also includes several other options, such as option 2 based on historic out-
put/capacity ratio; option 3 based on benchmarking; option 4 based on installation-
level projections using any metric (emissions, input, output); and option 5 based on
the marginal abatement cost. The choice of which option to apply rests with each
member state. There is another significant difference in Phase III in that as much
as 50% of allowances will be auctioned rather than given away. In the previous two
phases only a small amount of allowances were distributed via auction, 5% and 10%
in Phase I and Phase II respectively.
For each EU ETS phase, the total quantity of allowance to be allocated by each
Member State is defined in the Member State National Allocation Plan (NAP) (e-
quivalent to its UNFCCC-defined carbon account.) The European Commission has
oversight of the NAP process and decides if the NAP fulfills the 12 criteria set out in
3The detailed methods for different sectors are varied. For example, the combustion installations
are equal their 2002 direct emissions multiply projected output growth rate between 2002 and the
first phase then multiply by change in energy per unit output required target between 2002 and the
first phase. Also, those values are also adjusted by the possible growth rate.
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Annex III of the Emission Trading Directive (EU 2003/87/EC). The first and fore-
most criterion is that the proposed total quantity is in line with a Member States
Kyoto target.
The main participants in the allocation process are the European Commission,
the member state governments, and firms that were to be included in the scheme
and would be the main recipients of allowances. The role of these participants varies
according to the two main issues to be decided: the ’macro’ decision concerning
the total number of allowances to be created by each member state, and the micro
decision concerning how this total would be allocated to affected firms in each member
state. Each member state took the initiative in proposing in its National Allocation
Plan (NAP) total and in specifying the allocation to installations, but both aspects
were subject to review by the commission. The allocation of the shortage to the
EU15 resulted from the structure of the member-state commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol.
In each trading period, the large emitters obtain trading permits from the NAPs
and purchase EU and international trading credits as well. Each member state al-
locates allowances to each industrial sector. Since the electricity utility sector does
not face severe non-EU international competition, most EU15 countries allocated the
shortage to the power sector. The power plants account for a large amount of carbon
emissions and face the largest regulation constraints, which could be uneven among
EU countries. This potential difference is one reason why I focus on within-EU trade
flow changes before going to the international carbon leakage effects.4
The price of the permission per ton of carbon is determined by the market de-
mand and supply. The trading price is equal across the EU. Excessive allowances
will result in a low carbon price, and reduced emission abatement efforts (Newbery,
4Carbon leakage occurs when there is an increase in carbon dioxide emissions in one country as
a result of an emissions reduction by a second country with a strict climate policy.
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2009). Too few allowances will result in too high a carbon price (Hepburn, 2006, p.
239). Since most of the allowances are currently given away freely, it could be viewed
as endowments for each member country. Because of the mechanism of allocation
and possible leakage, emissions increase in countries or sectors that have weaker reg-
ulation; there is a potential pollution haven effect since the permits are distributed
and traded among countries, even though the trade price is the same across the EU.
It is possible that, within EU countries, there are countries with more stringent reg-
ulations that attained fewer quotas compared to what they could have attained, and
weaker regulated countries that possess more quotas.
One traditional way of environmental regulation is to add taxes on emitted pol-
lutants. Similarly, a cap-trade scheme with purchased permission also raises the cost
through increases of abatement costs. However, the possible outcomes of EU ETS are
not clear. The freely allocated allowance is viewed as a windfall asset for manufac-
turers, and the comparative advantage for those who have abundant emission quotas
will increase. Additionally, some countries have a very small proportion of allowances
sold through auctions rather than given freely. Though the amount is limited, less
than 5% in the first phase, and 10% in the second phase, they could have entirely
opposite effects compared to the freely allocated allowances.
The possibilities could be summarized in three main points: First, launching of
EU ETS is a strict environmental policy which could result in a disadvantage in
international competition. Even if there is no shortage for other industries, 64%
of companies responding to an October 2008 survey said they had average annual
costs of monitoring and reporting of £26,000 and average annual verification costs
of £9,000. Second, some industries claim that the allocation is a windfall financial
asset which could benefit their international competitiveness because in Phase I and
Phase II, most allowances are given away freely. Regions will export goods that
use locally abundant factors. That is, countries in the long-position may export
16
more goods that emit more CO2 within the European Union. Third, carbon leakage
may occur. External EU trading partners, not constrained by EU ETS, could have
larger emissions of carbon by producing more than before due to their comparative
advantage.
2.4 Theoretical Background
It seems that EU ETS distributes lump-sum allowances to countries and industries.
The lump-sum payment should generate no distortion on firms’ behavior. However,
considering the uneven spread of EU ETS on different countries and industries as
well as the change in amount of freely allocations, the payment definitely affects
firm or country’s competitive in the international market. The model presented in
this chapter provides a basic clue regarding on how the amount of freely allocated
allowances affects monopoly firms’ behavior, thus affecting international trade flows
as well.
Assume there are two countries, called North and South. North is regulated with
a cap-and-trade environmental policy while South is not. North produces two kinds
of goods, x and y. x is Cournot competed with South (duopoly in the international
market) while y is a monopoly in the international market. Both goods are regulated
by the environmental policy so I generate a partial equilibrium under the situation.
The demand functions for goods x and y are:
Px = a− bQNx − δQSx
Py = d− cQy





i (1− θi), with i ∈ S,N and j ∈ x, y, θi = 0 for i = S





x , and A stands for the technology term of each country. In this model, I
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assume that the social planner in North will distribute the emission allocation before
firms make production decisions. The freely allocated allowance is zx and zy. Firms
could trade their allocations freely and with no costs. The price of permission is
determined by the market. The effort of abatement is given as θi for each firm and
known by the government. ϕ(1 − θi)QNi is the final emissions of firm i. Thus, the
profit function for each producer in both countries is:
ΠNx = Q
N
x Px − wNLNx − P ∗ (ϕ(1− θx)QNx − zx)
ΠNy = Q
N
y Py − wNLNy − P ∗ (ϕ(1− θy)QNy − zy)
ΠSx = Q
N
x Px − wSLSx
Utility function for a representative consumer in country North follows a Cobb-
Douglas function and their income is composed of labor income only. Goods are sold
in the international market and consumers are price takers. Emissions from both
countries generate negative utility.
U = xαy1−α −H(ENx + ENy + ESx )
s.t. Pxx+ Pyy ≤ wN(LNx + LNy )





















The social planner’s utility is an electoral model, which is in terms of profits of firm
x and y, and utility of consumers. The social planner will choose freely allocated









Combining with the market clearing condition of emissions ENx + E
N
y = zx + zy, I
solve the firms’ decision given freely allocated allowance known, they are functions of
those parameters:
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Overall, the optimal allocations for each firm depend on its competitiveness in
international market. The competitiveness depends on the firms’ characteristics and
stringency of environmental regulations. Since I would like to evaluate environmen-
tal regulation in industry level, especially when comparing international trade flow
changes before and after EU ETS, environmental regulation is considered as a treat-
ment, while all firms’ characteristics in each industry and country could be controlled
by fixed effects.
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2.5 Data and Summary Statistics
Data contain export and import values for regulated sectors, gravity characteristics,
and EU ETS allowances from 2000 to 2011 for EU ETS participants.
This is an unbalanced panel dataset including more than 100,000 observations for
both exports and imports. The allowance data are available from the Community
International Transaction Log, version 11 (CITL v.11) provided by the European En-
vironmental Agency (EEA). The data include ten sectors: combustion installations;
mineral oil refineries; coke ovens; metal ore roasting sincerity; pig iron or steel; cement
clinker or lime; glass including glass fiber; ceramic products by finery; pulp, paper
and board and other activities which opted in. The last sector, “other activities opt-
ed i” was included to cover other installations opted in under Article 24 of the EU
ETS Directive. In practice, the activity of an installation which is listed under this
sector in the CITL is often not clear. Thus, I only focus on the nine sectors which
are clearly defined. The amount of allowances for each sector is shown in Figure 1.
The combustion installations take most of the total freely allocated allowances and
experienced reductions in Phase II. Compared to this sector, other eight sectors have
a relatively constant amount of allowances5.
There are two categories for allocation data, one is freely allocated EU allowances
(EUAs) and the other one is verified emissions. Information on verified emissions
and freely allocated EUAs is presented for two different scopes: “Verified emissions
(all installations)” and “Verified emissions (installations with emissions for 2008 un-
til 2011);” “Freely allocated EUAs” and “Freely allocated EUAs (installations with
emissions for 2008 until 2011).”
The freely allocated EUAs measure the amount of free allocation received, but do
5The outlier for metal ore roasting or sintering sector in 2007 is because there were several more
countries participating EU ETS in this sector since 2007 while the early members’ allowances were
not adjusted to fit the cap. Starting from 2008, the first year of Phase II, all allocated allowances
were adjusted.
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Figure 1: Allowances by year and sector
not include allowances bought. The verified emissions are emissions of the installa-
tion(s) which have been examined by a verifier. The second scope corresponds to a
constant scope: it takes into account the same installations across the years (those
for which verified emissions or freely allocated EUAs were reported throughout the
second trading period). This “constant scope” provides time-consistent information,
meaningful for a relevant trend analysis. The allowance is in the terms of tons of CO2
equivalent. EU ETS started with the EU-25 in 2005, but the number of countries cov-
ered has since increased to 30. Bulgaria and Romania entered EU ETS in 2007, and
Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein joined in 2008. The regulation status dummies I
used in regressions are generated for each industry by country and by year.
The amount of freely allocated allowances for EU ETS members is shown in Fig-
ure 2. The starting point shows the year when the country entered EU ETS. From
the graph, we notice that there is no significant cut in emission during Phase I and
Phase II. The emissions cap did not decrease during those two periods. The no-
ticeable reduction in Germany (DE) is due to those parts of allowances which are
21
allocated by auction. Besides EU ETS regulations, other Kyoto Protocol members
also started sub-national trading schemes. For example, Japan emissions trading in
Tokyo started in 2010 ran by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Canada started
emissions trading in Alberta in 2007 run by the Government of Alberta. The New
Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme started in 2008. These trading schemes are small-
er in scale and too new. Hence they are omitted in this chapter because EU ETS is
the only international and broadly spread regulation scheme covering a longer period
of time.
Figure 2: Total Allowances by Country and Year
Some countries sell some proportions of allowance by auctions. Those data are
not directly recorded by the CITL, but are available from other sources. Table 1
summarizes the amount EUAs auctioned or sold by countries and includes the relevant
sources. In regressions I generate a dummy for each country’s auction status instead























































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Export flows in United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany by industry
The international trade data are from EuroStat reflecting 2- or 3-digit SITC bilat-
eral trade flows in values from 2000 to 2011. The countries participating in EU ETS
are referred to as reporters. Table 2 shows how the SITC classification is matched
with EU ETS industry sectors. Since the combustion installations are not defined
as industrial sectors, the power generation equipment is used to approximate the de-
mand for further expansion of combustion installations. I selected four countries: the
United Kingdom and Spain, which are short in their allocated allowances, and France
and Germany, which are excessive in their allowances. Their imports and exports by
year and industry are shown in Figure 3 and 4. For most industries, there is no
obvious trade flow change before and after EU ETS, especially for mineral oils, which
24
shows a zigzag shape.
The necessary gravity variables are from the CEPII gravity dataset, which includes
common language, GDP, population, distance, area, time difference, legal origins,
GATT/WTO status and whether they have a common currency. CEPII data are
only available until 2006. I expanded it to 2011 by adding GDP and population
obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Other gravity


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Import flows in United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany by industry
2.6 Methodology
To estimate the effect of EU ETS on trade flows, I regress trade flows on gravity vari-
ables plus regulation status for EU ETS member countries (reporter countries above).
Furthermore, the effect of auction (whether an EU ETS member country auctioned
their allowances or not) on trade flows will be estimated. First a cross-sectional ap-
proach is used, and then I move to fixed effects. The difference-in-difference approach
is used to control for the ’real’ regulated status.6 For all the models, regressions
6The real regulated status is defined if a member state in EU ETS receives less allocated al-
lowances than it needs, either in the amount value or the finance flows. This is defined as ’short
position’ and ’net short position’ correspondingly. Further explanations are given in the following.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Reporter’s population 172,617 2.49E+07 2.58E+07 381,363 8.25E+07
Reporter’s GPD per Capita 172,617 18112.25 10,399.7 1,579.348 56388.99
Partner’s population 167,681 6.08E+07 1.90E+08 9,419 1.34E+09
Partner’s population 163,865 10,280.55 12,244.89 82.67167 67,554.23
Import 172,617 2.53E+07 2.19E+08 0 1.87E+10
Export 172,617 1.81E+07 1.26E+08 0 7.00E+09
Reporter’s allocation 52,356 1.55E+07 3.60E+07 0 3.85E+08
Partner’s allocation 8,148 9,395,979 2.44E+07 0 1.99E+08
are on samples of imports and exports for EU ETS member countries with more
than 200 partner countries, then intra-EU trade and extra-EU trade are investigated
separately. The linear regression model is:
log xijts = β0 + βXijt + γD + δR + σ ∗ (sectordummies ∗R) + ϵijts
where Xijst stands for the trade flow from country i to country j at time t in sector s.
Xijt includes all gravity variables such as GDP per capita and population for origins
and destinations in log terms, area, distance, legal origins and common language,
common boarder dummies. R stands for the regulation status for home country
(origins in exports and destinations in imports). D is the full set of dummies for
industries and years. For partner countries of EU ETS members, regulation policies
on carbon dioxide are unclear or their emission trading policy is not comparable to EU
ETS. Thus, interaction of country and year dummies are included. The interactions
of regulation and industries are used to make the regulation effect more accurate
because sectors are not regulated at the same time in each country.
The fixed effects model contains the same regressors in addition to the full set of
dummies for importers and exporters. Dummies control for the unobserved partner
characteristics, in particular, for environmental policies other than EU ETS. There
are more than 20,000 groups (home country and partner country for certain industry)
28
with 170,000 observations on imports and exports. The panel data approach deals
with endogeneity, in particular for non EU ETS member countries.
In the fixed effects model, I focus on the change before and after EU ETS for
its member countries. However, even all the member countries are regulated by EU
ETS, they are not in the same ’position’. Thus, a method to evaluate the effect of
regulation for different countries on international trade is to use the difference-in-
difference approach. The data however, only include the participants and industries
under EU ETS, implying that finding the appropriate control and treatment group
becomes very important. According to the Climate Report for the first phase of EU
ETS, most countries are actually in the long position, meaning that more allowances
were allocated in the first phase than were needed by covered installations. The
countries in the short positions are Ireland, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom.
Noticeably, the carbon price decreases sharply at the end of Phase I due to excessive
quantity of permissions. Considering the carbon price was high at the beginning of
each phase and lower in later stages of each phase, it is possible that installations in
one country bought more than they sold but did not appear as net buyers because
the price was high when they were selling and low when they were buying. Thus,
with respect to net finance flows which are calculated for each year using the average
yearly price of Phase I spot allowances weighted by yearly net flows of allowances, the
United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Austria, Ireland, Slovenia are in the net short position.
France, Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic have a large proportion excessive
in carbon allowances to their needed. I use these two different treatments to conduct
difference-in-difference analysis.
When considering the impacts of the amount of allocated allowances on interna-
tional trade flows, the situation is more complicated. Even though the regulation
is forced for every EU member in larger emitting industries, the detailed allocation
plans are chosen by each country. The allocated amount is endogenous because taking
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the emissions into account, the shortage of allowance is allocated to the industries
that face less severe international competition such as combustion installations. The
most common way to deal with endogeneity is to find an outside instrument, such
as emission rates for each industry and each country. Unfortunately, corresponding
emission rates at the 2- or 3-digit SITC levels are not available to best of my knowl-
edge. In this chapter, heteroscedasticity is used as an instrument following Lewbels
(2012). This model is listed below:
Y1 = X
′β1 + Y2γ1 + ϵ1,
ϵ1 = α1U + V1
Y2 = X
′β2 + Y1γ2 + ϵ2,
ϵ2 = α2U + V2
It requires that the systems in which the correlation of errors across equations are
due to the presence of an unobserved common factor U. Besides all the trade related
exogenous variables, emission allocation allowance is a function of trade flows. On
the other hand, the trade flow is also in terms of allowances. In this model, U , V1,
and V2 are unobserved variables that are uncorrelated with X and are conditionally
uncorrelated with each other, conditioning on X. U is an omitted variable or other
unobserved factor that may directly influence both Y1 and Y2.
Those two are correlated by an unobserved common factor U which captures the
trade-off between the marginal benefit of environmental improvement and marginal
cost for industries. The moments of heteroskedasticity can be shown to be correlated
with the endogenous variables while uncorrelated with all the exogenous variables.
When conducting the empirical analysis, I take natural log value for the allowances.
For the non-regulated industries, I give them value equals to 1. The aim of this
regression is to find that for regulated countries, how the change in the amount of
freely allocated allowances affects international trade flows.
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2.7 Results
Table 4 and 5 reports the results for the cross-sectional regressions for imports and
exports of EU ETS member countries. The first column is the cross-sectional result.
Column 2 and 3 include fixed effects for each country. The gravity variables provide
expected results. Both the GDP for home and partner countries have positive and
significant coefficients. The coefficients of distance and time difference are negative
and significant at 1% level. Other variables, such as common language and colonial
relationship have positive and significant coefficients.
After taking country fixed effects into account, the population effect changed
relative to cross-sectional results. As expected, the regulation impact including the
interaction terms have reverse signs for imports and exports. If regulation benefits
manufacturers, I expect increases in exports and decreases in imports. If regulation
is impeding production as a result of costs increasing, we should observe decreases in
exports and increases in imports. The pooling regression shows a negative effect on
exports with a coefficient -0.964 while positive effects on imports with a coefficient
0.282, hence it implies the impeding result.
In column 4, country-by-year fixed effects for home and partner countries are
added to the regression. These terms also capture the effects of population and
GDP changes. The interactions of fixed effects are aimed to deal with unobservable
environmental or other trade policy changes that may affect trade flows. Comparing
those results with column 2 and 3, there is no significant quantitative difference. The










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From table 4, imports increase by 0.28 log-point as a result of the regulation,
while exports decrease by 0.96. The differences in magnitudes between imports and
exports could be explained as the regulation having greatly changed the behavior of
manufacturers. The pollution haven hypothesis implies that as those manufacturers
have less comparative advantage than before, their exports to other countries decrease.
However, for imports, the case is more complicated.
If manufacturers cut their production in the short run, the total domestic pro-
duction will decrease as imports increase. In the long run, they may adjust their
investment or move to a lower emission technology. Therefore, I expect a smaller
impact on the value of imports than exports. The coefficient for auctions is not sig-
nificant, which may due to a relatively small amount being auctioned compared to
grandfathered allowances.
The interactions of industries and regulation status all have significant coefficients
except for the mineral oil refinery in imports. The exports for mineral oil refinery in-
crease significantly, while imports decrease. One explanation for this deviation is that
the factors that could affect mineral oil trade are more complicated even after con-
trolling for trade and environmental policies. The corresponding SITC is Petroleum,
petroleum products and related materials. Especially for petroleum, imports are quite
stable. Hence, its result is less obvious when compared to other sectors.
The interaction terms coefficients of all industries show significant decreases in
imports and increases in exports, although the pure effect of regulation raises imports
and reduces exports. If we combine the pure effect of regulation and the interaction
terms, for cements, glass, ceramics and pulp papers, EU ETS decreases exports and
also increases imports. While for iron steel industry which has excessive allowances,
EU ETS actually increases its exports, decreases imports.
Next I use the same model as in columns 2 and 3, but separate the sample into the
intra-EU and extra-EU trade since within-EU trade accounts for a large portion of
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total trade flows in EU ETS member countries. These results are presented in Table
6 for exports and Table 7 for imports. The coefficients of the regulation dummies
imply that the overall dimension of trade shifts depends on intra-EU trade. The
results suggest that EU ETS changed the trade pattern within EU because of the
unbalanced freely allocated allowances among countries and industries. On the extra











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For example, exports from EU countries of iron steel are actually increasing after
EU ETS as a result of excessive freely allocated allowances to those industries. On
the other side for iron steel, regulations decrease imports. Similarly, the results are
more significant on exports than imports.
The auction status is still insignificant. It suggests that countries that tried auc-
tion rather than giving allowances away export more to other EU countries and import
more from non-EU countries. Notably, intra EU exports of combustion installations
related equipment increases significantly. A reason for this increase is that if the
national allocation plan allocates the shortage mostly on the combustion installation
sectors, it may increase the demand for fewer emissions and more efficient equipment.
Similarly, the increase in exports to EU countries in combustion installation sectors
could be explained by the same reason.
In order to further test the pollution haven effect, I separate extra EU trade
partners into five groups according to their income level. The country class level is
obtained from World Bank. The results are shown in Table 8. The detailed results
also vary across industries; however, the trend implies that after EU ETS, exports to
relatively poor countries decrease, while they increase to the rich countries. This result
is consistent with the right side of the U-shape environmental Kuznets curve. On
the imports side, after EU ETS, EU countries are importing more from lower middle
income and upper middle income countries but not from lower income countries. This
result is consistent with the left side of the U-shaped Kuznets curve. The pollution



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The two difference-in-difference regressions give similar results as the fixed effects
model in Table 9. The magnitude of the effect of regulation on exports and imports are
-0.9 and 0.26 correspondingly. The total effects of regulations on member countries
that are in short position show a decrease in exports and an increase in imports.
The interaction term of net short positions and treatment (regulation) suggests that
those countries face both as increase in imports and exports (0.189 comparing to
15.139) after the regulation. This result implies that the current EU ETS policies
push countries with more demand in carbon emissions into a disadvantage vis-á-vis
international competition. Table 10 shows how the quantity of allocated allowances
affects international trade flows. The two panels of this table stand for imports and
exports respectively. All columns control for country × year fixed effects. Columns
(1) does not control for the possible endogeneity of allowances. On exports side, one
percent change in freely allocated allowances will bring up exports by 2.7% and this
result is significant at 1% level. Auction status is significant and negative in this
analysis. Imports side has all opposite results to exports, allowances has negative
impact on imports and auction has positive impacts on the value of imports, though
these results are not significant. These results convinced the hypothesis that more
freely allocated allowances give more advantages to the producers, which means more
exports, but less imports. After controlling for the endogeneity, there is not change
for the sign, but the coefficient are larger. Also, I separate the samples into intra
EU and extra EU trade as before, it yields constant results, and only on exports
coefficients are significant. The effect of the amount of freely allocated allowances
is larger within EU than extra-EU. The IV parts are plausible taking the excessive
allowances into account. Moreover, as discussed above, the regulations change the
manufacturers’ behavior rather than the demand in the market. Hence, for exports
the results are significant.
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Table 9: Diff-in-Diff Results
EXPORTS IMPORTS
Short Net- Short Net-
Position short Position short
position position
Regulation -1.006*** -0.970*** 0.257 0.280*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13)
Interaction1 0.820*** 0.793*** -0.685*** -0.698***
pulp paper (0.1) (0.1) (0.15) (0.15)
Interaction2 1.030*** 1.006*** -0.369* -0.381*
metal ore roasting (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15)
Interaction4 1.378*** 1.347*** -0.16 -0.182
mineral oil refinary (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14)
Interaction5 1.108*** 1.090*** -0.438** -0.450**
pig iron or steel (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14)
Interaction6 1.150*** 1.127*** -0.503*** -0.521***
combustion installation (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14)
Interaction7 0.781*** 0.754*** -0.572*** -0.585***
cement and clinker or lime (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14)
Interaction8 0.618*** 0.594*** -0.883*** -0.902***
glass (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14)
Interaction9 0.644*** 0.619*** -0.982*** -1.004***
ceramic products by fining (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14)
Auction -0.069* -0.053 -0.064 -0.028
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Short position -2.930*** -7.042***
(0.2) (0.57)
Short* 0.161*** 0.127**
time control (0.03) (0.04)
timecontrol 0.490*** 0.553*** 0.147 0.197*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
Net-short position 0.063 0.01
(0.06) (0.05)
Net-short* 0.189*** 15.139***
time control (0.04) (2.32)
R-sqr 0.579 0.579 0.544 0.544
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,*** p < 0.001
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Table 10: Allowances and Auction Effects on Bilateral Trade Flows
Fixed effects
No control IV IV Intra IV Extra
Exports
Allocation 0.027*** 0.159*** 0.329*** 0.127***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Auction -0.604*** -0.053 0.132 -0.087
(0.23)
R-sqr 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.54
Imports
Allocation -0.02 -0.002 1.46 0.00
(0.01) (0.020) (5.02) (0.06)
Auction 0.82
(3.98)
R-sqr 0.540 0.556 0.59 0.51
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
2.8 Robustness
I conduct several robustness checks. Results are reported in Table 11. The first
robustness check is to use three-year windows for the dataset since the industries
could make adjustment according to the regulations, and those adjustments will not
manifest themselves in trade flows until several years later. The second one is to
limit the sample to EU-15 countries only because EU-15 countries are forced into
EU ETS rather than opted in. The third robustness check is changing the contained
industrial sectors in the sample, such as excluding iron and steel sectors or combustion
installations.
The three-year window gives the same results as before. EU-15 countries which
face the emission cut have a significant increase in exports, while the change in exports
is not significant. After excluding the combustion sector (SITC 71), the results are still
robust. Also, according to the Climate Report, the sector with the largest excessive
allocated allowance is iron and steel. Excluding iron and steel sectors, the regulation
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effect is still negative, but insignificant. When excluding both combustion installation













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.9 Conclusion and Further study
In this chapter, I use the cross-section, cross-time bilateral trade flow data to eval-
uate the EU Emission Trading Scheme effect on international trade with a gravity
model based on the pollution haven hypothesis. The impact of auctions is also exam-
ined. The difference-in-difference approach is used to study the regulation effect on
countries which are in shortage of allowances. To examine the effects more precisely,
the samples are separated into intra EU trade and extra EU trade. Moreover, trade
flows changes are also examined for different country income level. The effects of the
amount of freely allocated allowances on trade flows are also investigated through an
IV model.
EU ETS increases imports and decreases exports. The separate regression implies
that the pollution haven is generated with respect to the middle income and upper
middle income countries. The member countries which are in the (net) short position
do face reductions in comparative advantage. The effect of auctions is not significant
due to the small portion of the total allowances. Those results suggest that there is
a pollution haven effect caused by EU ETS among EU countries.
The empirical results in this chapter suggest several importation policy implica-
tions. EU ETS increases imports into its member countries and decrease exports by
a larger amount. Especially for countries in the short or net-short position in emis-
sion trading, their comparative advantage in international trade is weakened by EU
ETS. The further tightening of the emission cap or increases in the compliance cost
for producers (auctioned) could disadvantage regulated countries in the international
competition. Pollution haven was generated by EU ETS, particularly for industries
short in allowances. Considering that greenhouse gas is a global pollutant, further
sacrificing EU economic benefits may not be an optimal choice.
Even though, there are still excessive allowances for current EU ETS policies. For
some industries, such as iron and steel, the total effect of EU ETS is to increase their
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comparative advantages. Thus, in order to achieve the emission goals in the third
phase, their allocated allowances could be cut, or auctioned. Also, according to my
results, the trade pattern is controllable by varying the freely allocated allowances.
But, the effect of auction on international trade is still unclear.
The trade shifts within EU away from the countries with abundant permissions
to others. The domestic production and foreign direct investment should also be
investigated since the pollution haven hypothesis also suggests that polluted industries
relocated from countries with stringent regulations to the countries with less stringent
regulations. Controls for the partners corresponding regulations would be beneficial.




TESTING THE POLLUTION HAVEN HYPOTHESIS OF
EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE VERSUS FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT
3.1 Introduction
As the largest international cap-and-trade environmental regulation, EU ETS is trying
to limit the total emissions of green house gas. Based on pollution haven hypothesis,
running cap-and-trade scheme may increase the cost of abatement, thus harm the
production in regulated industries. There is no clear answer whether EU ETS affect
firms’ behavior and comparative advantages on international competitions. Till today,
EU ETS has completed two phases. The ’cap’ for all countries are cut dramatically
from phase I to phase II. There is also adjustments among industries. Phase I ran from
January, 1, 2005 to 31st December, 2007 and covered only carbon dioxide emissions
from energy activities (combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding
20MW, mineral oil refineries, coke ovens), production and processing of ferrous metals,
mineral industry (cement clinker, glass and ceramic bricks) and pulp, paper and board
activities. Phase II ran from January, 1, 2008 to December, 31, 2012. EU ETS, like
other environmental regulations, generates both benefits of emissions also costs for
conducting them. Those effects could be reflected in both international trade and
FDI.
In the first chapter, I show that EU ETS impedes regulated industries in in-
ternational competition by decreasing exports and increasing imports. This result
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confirmed pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) of EU ETS. FDI, which has been shown
as a substitution of bilateral trade (Markusen 2002) also acts as an important role in
international competitions. Given the intra-industry trade flows change, how firms’
FDI decisions change after EU ETS is an important issue to further verify PHH.
Based on Xing and Kolstad (2000), if environmental regulations generate distortions
in the operation of polluting industries, the multinational enterprise may initially re-
spond with the intra-firm transfer of its production facility, or increase the investment
in its subsidiaries located in the country with lenient regulation. These adjustments
plus relocation of the entire plants will change FDI flows. Moreover, EU ETS, as a
relatively new launched regulation scheme, firms may not be able to make relocation
decisions in short run. Thus, FDI is a great indicator of testing PHH.
In my model I introduce a third factor, emission of carbon dioxide into Markusen
(2002)’s model, combined both national exporting enterprises and horizontal multi-
national enterprises (HMNEs). National exporting enterprises have exports but no
FDI while HMNEs do foreign direct investment but no exports. Assuming free entry
and exit, the numbers of exporting enterprises and HMNEs are endogenous. A gen-
eral equilibrium model shows that the numbers of exporting enterprises and HMNEs
depend on a complex nonlinear relationships between trade, FDI, trade costs and
investment costs. It provides us with some clues as a guide for empirical study of
FDI and international trade flows.
Markusen (2000)’s model assumes that all the firms face the same efficient fac-
tor. However, when firms are heterogeneous, cap-and-trade environmental policy
with freely allocated allowances may affect firms differently since some firms receive
subsidies while other have to pay taxes. To further study entry and exit of national
exporting enterprises and horizontal multinational enterprises, I add a heterogeneous
productivity shocks upon entry. To simplify the model, I keep only two production
factors, labor and emissions of carbon dioxide. The model suggests a new aspect for
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the theory of environmental regulations with substitutions of FDI and international
trade flows. My model suggests that there will be a reduction for both inward FDI
as well as outward FDI.
Moreover, I conduct an empirical study of the effects on FDI after controlling
international trade flows and other related factors. The data merges FDI flows with
3-digit SITC classification trade flows for EU ETS member countries. Based on
the theoretical model derived in section III, domestic price index, import price index,
wage index and production index in NACE Revise 2 are also contained into regression.
Since the correspondence of NACE Revision 2 and SITC are far from good in current
research, I build my own correspondences between NACE Revision 2 and SITC to help
merge the data. The coefficient of regulation dummy verified PHH that environmental
regulation decrease inward FDI to regulated countries, while there is no increase for
outward FDI to unregulated countries.
Many studies examine the empirical evidences on PHH as it pertains to FDI or
relocation of firms. A large number of them fails to find significant evidences. They
apply different ways to define the stringency of environmental regulation and pollution
density of industries. Earlier work, such as Lucas, Wheeler and Hettige (1992) and
Leonard and Duerksen (1980) examines the foreign investment in polluting industries
and the growth rate of polluting factories. However, none of these measurements
suggest a significant causal relationship between the location of pollution-intensive
industries and environmental regulation. Leonard and Duerksen (1980) examines
whether the growth of U.S. investment in developing countries exceed other invest-
ment growth rate. However, they do not find evidence to prove this hypothesis. In
fact, the gap between U.S. investment in developing countries versus developed coun-
tries widened for some polluting industries. Lucas, Wheeler and Hettige (1992) tests
whether the OECDs environmental policies drive dirty industries to developing coun-
tries. They also use the toxin emission density to measure the polluting industries
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and regress it on GDP and the growth rate of GDP per capital. Even though they do
find poorest countries have highest growth rate of polluting industries, but insufficient
to show that the environmental regulation contribute to this growth.
Similarly, some earlier research restricted within U.S. domestic environmental reg-
ulation did not reach significant results either. McConnell and Schwab (1990) use a
location model to test the relationship between the location of the automobile indus-
try and state-level environmental regulations. Batrtik (1988) also applies a location
decision model to examine new factories opening by the Fortune 500 firms from 1972
to 1978 with state spending on pollution control and compliance costs of regulat-
ed industries in state-level. His result also shows that none of the environmental
regulations significantly affect location decisions. However, after controlling for the
endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity across locations by using panel data in pe-
riod from 1963 to 1992, Becker and Henderson (2000) find striking result that plant
births for polluting industries in non-attainment counties which are subjected to more
stringent environmental policy comparing to attainment counties were 26− 45% low-
er. Comparing to previous literature, panel data allow them to control for unobserved
heterogeneity across locations and they use country-level data instead of state-level
data. But there is still no significant results found. Keller and Levinson (2002) claim
that the endogeneity problems are partly responsible for the failure of the earlier
literature to find significant effects. In their paper they also use U.S. state-level F-
DI inflows data from 1977 to 1994 and pollution abatement costs per unit of output.
The replication of earlier OLS regression does provide insignificant results, while after
adjusting state effects, they find the coefficient on abatement costs is negative and
significant.
Others have examined data for different countries. Wagner and Timmins (2009)
study this issue by analyzing the impact of environmental regulations on the out-
ward FDI of German manufacturing industries over 1996 and 2003. They emphasize
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the need to control for externalities resulting from FDI agglomeration, proxied by
the total stock of inward FDI in the destination country. Their two-step estimator
controls for endogenous time-varying determinants of FDI flows and unobserved het-
erogeneity at the country level. Their results show that the total stock of FDI is
statistically significant for all six industries. Edward Anderson and Richard Kneller
(2012) examine the environmental regulation impact on UKs FDI outflows. They
apply heterogeneous firm models of international trade. Their result suggests that
the environmental regulations are not a robustly significant determinant of the in-
ternationalization decision. Furthermore, they do not find robust evident that dirty
multinational enterprises are more likely to locate in countries with lax environmental
policy than cleaner ones. Cole and Elliott (2005) investigate the relationship between
US outward FDI and factor endowments across sectors to Mexico and Brazil. Al-
though imports from Mexico have grown more rapidly than exports to Mexico, no
evidence is found to suggest that North American Free Trade Agreements is increas-
ing displacement to Mexico. The capital constraints explain why the pollution haven
does not have a wide spread.
There are several differences between this chapter and the current literature. First,
unlike most of the early research which focuses on local pollutants and overall environ-
mental regulations by generating abatement cost for the firms, I study the pollution
haven effect caused by a single important environmental regulation scheme, EU ETS,
a cross-country regulation focusing on a global pollutant, carbon dioxide. Besides the
issues mentioned in chapter 1 about free riders, possible carbon leakage that are quite
different from local pollutants, my study isolates the effect of EU ETS to provide more
implication for further improvement and expansion of green-house-gas cap-and-trade
schemes not only within EU, but also the rest of the world.
Also, rather than focusing only on FDI, in this chapter, I build a model that
consists of both FDI and international trade flows which are taken as substitutes.
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The inclusion of both could give a clearer understanding of the effect of EU ETS and
whether it generates a pollution haven effect or not. In order to explain how the flows
change and substitute for each other, the endogenous determination of the number
of firms, firms’ efficiency, and entry and exit are introduced into the model as well.
The model suggests that the output of regulated firms is lower than that of un-
regulated firm given the same productivity. If two different regulated firms are under
a uniform freely allocated allowances scheme, the more efficient one is more likely
to exit the market. It is plausible that EU ETS will not only decrease FDI inward
flows because of higher cost of regulation, but it will also decrease FDI outward flows
because efficient firms are driven out of the market. Empirical evidence verifies the
model’s results. FDI inward flows greatly reduced because of EU ETS, while outward
flows also decrease slightly. However, none of those results are statistically significant.
This chapter is outlined as following. In section II, I describe EU ETS and its
possible outcomes in detail. In section III, a 2 × 2 model with labor, capital and
emission as production factors is introduced. Section IV simplifies the model with
only labor and emissions but heterogeneity of firms is added. Section V describes the
empirical study of EU ETS impacts on FDI. I also discuss the results in this section.
The chapter’s conclusion follows in section VI.
3.2 European Union Emission Trading System
As noted above in the previous chapter, EU ETS is the first large emission trading
scheme in the world encompassing 27 EU countries plus Iceland, Norway, and Liecht-
enstein, covering more than 10,000 installations with a net heat excess of 20 MW
in energy and industrial sectors which are collectively responsible for half of EU’s
emissions of carbon dioxide. It was launched on January, 1, 2005 as an outcome of
the Kyoto Protocol. There are three phases of EU ETS. Phase I ran from January, 1,
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2005 to 31st December, 2007 and covered only carbon dioxide emissions from ener-
gy activities (combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20MW,
mineral oil refineries, coke ovens), production and processing of ferrous metals, min-
eral industry (cement clinker, glass and ceramic bricks) and pulp, paper and board
activities. Phase II ran from January, 1, 2008 to December, 31, 2012. During this
period, EU ETS includes revised monitoring and reporting rules, more stringent e-
missions caps and additional combustion sources. New industries were included, such
as airlines being added at the beginning of 2012. Phase III started on 1st January
2013 and will go until December, 31, 2020. This period will bring major changes,
such as harmonized allocation methodologies and inclusion of additional greenhouse
gases and emission sources. EU ETS will be expanded to include petrochemicals,
ammonia and aluminum industries and additional gases in 2013. The cap will be cut
by as much as 20% compared to Phase II. This chapter covers the first two phases of
EU ETS and studies how the current policies affect firms’ performances.
In the first two phases, the scheme initially distributed most of the quotas through
grandfathering– freely allocated allowances according to each member countries’ Ky-
oto Protocol emission target. For each EU ETS phase, the total quantity of allowance
to be allocated by each Member State is defined in the Member State National Alloca-
tion Plan (NAP) (equivalent to its UNFCCC-defined carbon account.) The European
Commission has oversight of the NAP process and decides if the NAP fulfills the 12
criteria set out in Annex III of the Emission Trading Directive (EU 2003/87/EC).
The first and foremost criterion is that the proposed total quantity is in line with
a Member States Kyoto target. The distribution of emission allowances also differs
across phases. Phase I is based on historical emissions and installation levels.1 In
1The detailed methods for different sectors are varied. For example, the combustion installations
are equal their 2002 direct emissions multiply projected output growth rate between 2002 and the
first phase then multiply by change in energy per unit output required target between 2002 and the
first phase. Also, those values are also adjusted by the possible growth rate.
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Phase II, besides historical emissions and installation levels, several other options are
added for chosen, such as option 2 based on historic output/capacity ratio; option
3 based on benchmarking; option 4 based on installation-level projections using any
metric (emissions, input, output); and option 5 based on the marginal abatement cost.
The choice of which option to apply rests with each member state. But in Phase III,
rather than freely distributed, as much as 50% of allowances will be auctioned. In the
previous two phases only a small amount of allowances were distributed via auction,
5% and 10% in Phase I and Phase II respectively.
The main participants in the allocation process are the European Commission,
the member state governments, and firms would be the main recipients of allowances.
The role of these participants varies according to the two main issues to be decided:
the “macro” decision concerning the total number of allowances to be created by each
member state, and the “micro” decision concerning how this total would be allocated
to affected firms in each member state. Each member state took the initiative in
proposing in its National Allocation Plan (NAP) total and in specifying the allocation
to installations, but both aspects were subject to review by the commission. The
allocation of the shortage to the EU15 resulted from the structure of the member-
state commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.
In each trading period, the large emitters obtain trading permits from the NAPs
and purchase EU and international trading credits as well. Each member state al-
locates allowances to each industrial sector. Since the electricity utility sector does
not face severe non-EU international competition, most EU15 countries allocated the
shortage to the power sector. The power plants account for a large amount of carbon
emissions and face the largest regulation constraints, which could be uneven among
EU countries. This is one reason why I focus on within-EU trade flow changes before
going to the international carbon leakage effects.2
2Carbon leakage occurs when there is an increase in carbon dioxide emissions in one country as
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The price of the permission per ton of carbon is determined by the market demand
and supply. The trading price is equal across the EU. Excessive allowances will result
in a low carbon price, and reduced emission abatement efforts (Newbery, 2009). Too
few allowances will result in too high a carbon price (Hepburn, 2006). Since most of
the allowances are currently given away freely, it could be viewed as endowments for
each member country. Because of the mechanism of allocation and possible leakage,
which is the effect of emissions increasing in countries or sectors that have weaker
regulations; there is a potential pollution haven effect since the permits are distributed
and traded among countries, even though the trade price is the same across the EU.
It is possible that, within EU countries, there are countries with more stringent
regulations that attained fewer quotas compared to what they could have attained,
and weaker regulated countries that possess more.
One traditional way of environmental regulation is to add taxes on emitted pol-
lutants. Similarly, a cap-trade scheme with purchased permission also raises the cost
through increases of abatement costs. However, the possible outcomes of EU ETS are
not clear. The freely allocated allowance is viewed as a windfall asset for manufac-
turers, the comparative advantage for those who have abundant emission quotas will
increase. Additionally, some countries do have a very small proportion of allowances
sold through auctions rather than given freely. Though the amount is limited, less
than 5% in the first phase, and 10% in the second phase, they could have entirely
opposite effects compared to the freely allocated allowances. The possibilities could
be summarized in three main points: First, launching of EU ETS is a strict environ-
mental policy that could result in disadvantage in international competition. Even
if there is no shortage for other industries, 64% of companies responding to an Oc-
tober 2008 survey said they had average annual costs of monitoring and reporting
of £26,000 and average annual verification costs of £9,000. Second, some industries
a result of an emissions reduction by a second country with a strict climate policy.
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claim that the allocation is a windfall financial asset which could benefit their inter-
national competitiveness because in Phase I and Phase II, most allowances are given
away freely. Regions will export goods that use locally abundant factors, that is,
countries in the long-position may export more goods that emit more CO2 within
the EU. Third, carbon leakage may occur. External EU trading partners, those who
are not constrained by EU ETS, could have larger emissions of carbon by producing
more than before due to their comparative advantage.
3.3 Model Setup
This model is a 2×2 model based on Markusen (2002) with national exporting enter-
prises and HMNEs. Also, to study the effect of environmental regulation, I extended
the model by changing the production factors to labor, capital and carbon emissions
based on Copeland and Taylor (1994). The model incorporates two countries, coun-
try 1 and country 2. Both of them could produce two goods, x and y. Good y is
homogenous and can be produced with constant returns by a competitive industry
with only one production factor–labor, and will be used as numeraire. Producers
for good x are differentiated. 3 The capital is mobile as FDI flows, thus the MNEs
could adjust their allocations of capital between headquarters country and its affili-
ate abroad. Differentiated goods producers operate in a monopolistically competitive
market. The output of both goods follows a Cobb-Douglas function. There are two
kinds of firms in producing good x, one are national enterprises who can produce
differentiated goods for the home market and also export them to a foreign country
with transportation and tariff costs. The other kind are HMNEs that must have a
plant in each country but cannot participate in exporting.
3Only regulated countries– EU ETS members have to pay for the carbon emission factors, thus
we can view it as immobile.
56
The production function of numeraire good y is:
yi = Li, (i = 1, 2, 3)
I assume country 1 is the numeraire, thus, py1 = wy1 = 1.
Similarly, the production function of good x is also given by a Cobb-Douglas
function. Assume all firms in both countries have the same technology term B,
and let Kxi, Sxi and Zxi stands for the quantities of capital, labor and emissions








α is the share of main factors in production and γ is the degree of substitutability
between labor and capital. Even if all firms faces the same technology, they differ
in fixed costs. If firms face environmental regulations, their abatement technologies
have to use labor and capital to reduce emissions. If there is no regulation, following
Copeland and Taylor (1994), one unit of production requires one unit of emission.
That is the bound on the substitution possibility between other two factors and
pollution inputs. The production function of good x can be written as:
Fxi = B
1





National enterprises maximize profits by choosing labor, capital and emission
inputs. Under this case, let cxi denote marginal production costs of differentiated
good x in country i. The profit function of national enterprises firms are:
πn1 = (px1 − cx1)(x11 + x12)− fn1
πn2 = (px2 − cx2)(x21 + x22)− fn2
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stands for domestic sale of national enterprises in country 1, x12 denotes its exports
to country 2. fn1 denotes the fixed cost of entering the market for national enterprises.
The profit function for HMNEs is:
πh1 = (px1 − cx1)xh11 + (px2 − cx2)xh12 − fn11 − fn12
πh2 = (px1 − cx1)xh21 + (px2 − cx2)xh22 − fn21 − fn22



































ij stands for the production in country j by firm
whose headquarter is in countryi. As mentioned before, capital is mobile with no
transportation costs, HMNEs still rent labor from their home countries but the other
two inputs, labor and emissions have to be purchased from the country in which the
plant located.
On the demand side, I assume that consumers have a Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion between goods x and good y. The utility function is constant elasticity of substi-
tution (CES). Consumers in country i could buy goods form both domestic producers,
the national enterprises, HMNEs headquarters and also imported goods from country
j. As a reminder, national enterprises could export to a foreign country. HMNE’s
production by the headquarters only serve the domestic market. At the meantime,
their productions in offshore firms only serves the foreign market. Besides benefits
from consumption, consumers also face hazardous pollution caused by production of
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− Φ(Zn1 + Zn2 + Zh1 + Zh2 )
The first component stands for domestic consumption of national enterprises,
the second component stands for domestic consumption of export good from foreign
national enterprises. The third term is domestic consumption from home HMNEs.
The fourth term denotes the domestic consumption from foreign HMNEs. ni and ji
are endogenous numbers of national enterprises and HMNEs in country i. tij is the
gross trade cost of exporting good x from country j to i. The consumption of good y
also includes both domestic y and imported y. The last term is the harm generated
by pollution of all productions from both types of firms in both countries.
Following Bergstrand and Egger(2007), the gross trade cost is defined as:
txij = (1 + bxij)(1 + τxij)
where τ denotes a “natural” trade cost of the iceberg type, while b stands for the
tariff rate.
Since free entry and exit is allowed, firms do not make profits and the income of
consumers is only from wages, rents and emissions. The tariff revenue is redistributed
in lump-sum payments by the government to consumers. If we assume country 1
imposes a cap-and-trade environmental regulation, the revenue collected Rz will also
transfer to consumer through lump-sum payments. Thus, income can be written as:
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xh22 + py1y12 + py2y22




of good x which are produced within country 1. According to the property of Cobb-
Douglas utility function, we can derive the expenditure for good x and good y:
X = ηE/Px













By using the price index, we can generate the demand function for each type of good





Assuming consumers are price takers and global emissions are also given, taking the







Then we can move to the maximization of profits for all firms. If we further assume
that country 1 has cap-and-trade regulation with uniform freely allocated allowances






1 (L,K,Z)− w1Ln1 − r1Kn1 − pz(s− Zn1 )− fn1
πh1 = p(q11
h(L1, K1, Z1))q11










2 (L,K,Z)− w2Ln2 − r2Kn2 − fn2
πh2 = p(q21
h(L1, K2, Z1))q21





− w1L21 − w2L22 − r2(K21 +K22)− pz(s− Z21)− fh1 − fh2
In equilibrium, I assume no profit is earned by firms and all factors are fully
employed. Under this case, the social welfare will be a function of total production
and pollution. The complexity of the model introduces a high degree of nonlinearity.
In Markusen(2002) and Bergstrand, Egger (2007), rather than giving an analyti-
cal solution, they provide numerical solution to the model by simulation. Choosing
parameters and exogenous variables’ values could be a problem for those kinds of
simulation. Thus, in my work, I will conduct an empirical study to relate the model
with econometric evidence.
3.4 Heterogenous Firms
In the previous section, I assume all firms face the same technological constraint, thus,
the same marginal cost for production. In order to determine firms’ entry and exit
more precisely, I add heterogeneity to firms technology constraint. Assume each firm
is endowed with productivity level ϕ ∈ (0,∞) with higher ϕ as higher productivity.
To simplify this complicated case, instead of using all production factor, I assume



























Similarly, we can generate a demand function in terms of expenditure and price index:






















The production of good x has two inputs, labor and emissions. Labor is mobile
under this case, HMNEs only hire workers from their own country. Emission is “im-
mobile”, thus HMNEs’ affiliates in non-regulated country do not need to pay for pol-
lution. Like before, if there is no environmental regulation, one unit of output requires
one unit of emission. The production functions are defined as, i ∈ (11, 12, 22, 21) and






Profit functions for national enterprises and HMNEs in regulated countries are:
πn1 = p1q
n
1 − w1Ln1 − f1 − pz(s− zn1 )
πh1 = p1q
h
11 − w1L1 − f1 − pz(s− zh11) + p2qh12 − w1L1 − f2
Profit functions for non-regulated countries are:
πn2 = p2q
n
2 − w2Ln2 − f2
πh2 = p1q
h
21 − w2L2 − f1 − pz(s− zh21) + p2qh22 − w2L2 − f2






Regulated firms have to substitute labor with emission in terms of α and relative




ϕB)−1 where B =
αα(1− α)1−α
pαz











A is larger than B, thus, for firms with same productivity, non-regulated firms pro-
duce more. Similarly, the emissions for a regulated firm are smaller than for a non-
regulated firm. If both of them are under the same circumstance, wether regulated
or not, the more efficient firm generates more emissions than the less efficient firm
in total amount. The marginal cost can be obtained since the firm chooses the opti-



















The regulation will drive out some high efficient national enterprises under u-
niformly distributed allowances. It will also affect some of HMNEs since I assume
they have to have plants in both countries. However, if HMNEs can relocate most of
their resources or production to unregulated country, they will not be driven out of
the market. But under the circumstance that allocation plans rather than uniformly
distribution are applied, results could be different.
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3.5 Empirical study
From the model above, in order to estimate the effect of EU ETS on FDI, we need
to isolate the effect on HMNEs from national enterprises that export goods abroad.
FDI flows change depends on firms’ characteristics (productivity), wage of labor,
rent of capital, revenue or payment after cap-and-trade emission regulation, prices of
importing goods and price of domestic goods. Same as international trade, FDI also
has inward and outward flows. Generally, inward FDI is treated as a substitute for
imports, outward FDI as a substitute for exports. I will separate inward and outward
flows into two parts when conducting my analysis.
The sample includes both regulated and non-regulated industry of all EU member
countries before and after EU ETS. A dummy for regulation status for each industry
in each country and year will reflect the impacts on the dependent variable, FDI
flows. Besides all relevant variables mentioned in the last paragraph, fixed effects
are also included in regressions, they are country × year dummy as well as industry
dummies. The fixed effects panel regression in empirical studies could solve the
possible endogeneity caused by unobserved variables and self-selections. The linear
regression model is:
FDIjits = β0 + βXits + γD + δR + σV
j
its + ϵijts j ∈ (inward, outward)
where Xits denotes main characteristics for country i in year t at industry s. It
includes production index, domestic price index, import price index and wage rate for
corresponding country, industry and year, as well as GDP and population. R stands
for regulation status of EU ETS, if an industry in country i at year t is covered by
EU ETS, R = 1. D stands for all fixed effects dummies mentioned above. V is the
log value of international trade flows.
In the previous chapter, I show that international trade flows are significantly
affected by EU ETS. That is, regulation increases imports and decreases exports for
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regulated industries. After partialling out countries’ characteristics, such as GDP and
population, FDI flows should have a negative relationship with international trade
flows. The coefficient of R should reveal the real effects of EU ETS on FDI flows after
controlling all those variables.
The data are an unbalanced annual panel from 2000 to 2012, that is 5 years
before EU ETS and two phases of EU ETS since 2005. All EU countries are in-
cluded. Countries joined EU ETS at different years. EU 15 were required to join
EU ETS in 2005, while the rest of them joined EU ETS in 2007 and the following
years. Moreover, not all industries are joined at the same time within a country. The
FDI flows are obtained from OECD in Extraction of crude petroleum and natural
resources, mining and quarrying, qgriculture and fishing, food products, textiles and
wearing apparel, wood publishing and printing, refined petroleum & other treatments,
rubber and plastic products, chemical products, medical precision and optical instru-
ments,construction, metal product, office machinery and computers, motor vehicles,
other transport equipments, manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft.
The allowance data are available from the Community International Transac-
tion Log, version 13 (CITL v.13) provided by the European Environmental Agency
(EEA). The data include ten sectors: combustion installations; mineral oil refineries;
coke ovens; metal ore roasting sincerity; pig iron or steel; cement clinker or lime; glass
including glass fiber; ceramic products by finery; pulp, paper and board and other
activities which opted in. The last sector, “other activities opted in” was included
to cover other installations opted in under Article 24 of the EU ETS Directive. In
practice, the activity of an installation that is listed under this sector in the CITL is
often not clear. Thus, I only focus on the nine sectors that are clearly defined. The
amount of allowances for each sector is shown in Figure 1. The combustion instal-
lations take most of the total freely allocated allowances and experienced reductions
in Phase II. Compared to combustion installation sector, other eight sectors have a
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relatively constant amount of allowances4.
Figure 5: Allowances by year and sector
There are two categories for allocation data, one is freely allocated EU allowances
(EUAs) and the other one is verified emissions. Information on verified emissions
and freely allocated EUAs is presented for two different scopes: “Verified emissions
(all installations)” and “Verified emissions (installations with emissions for 2008 un-
til 2012)”; “Freely allocated EUAs” and “Freely allocated EUAs (installations with
emissions for 2008 until 2012)”.
All other data are obtained from Euro Stat. Intra-industry trade flow data are
from Euro Stat, with 3-digit SITC classification format. The international trade
flows are in aggregate level for the rest of world, and also separated as intra-EU trade
and extra-EU trade to distinguish the regulated regions from unregulated regions
based on the theoretical model in section III. Domestic price index, production index,
4The outlier for metal ore roasting or sintering sector in 2007 is because there were several more
countries participating EU ETS in this sector since 2007 while the early members’ allowances were
not adjusted to fit the cap. Starting from 2008, the first year of Phase II, all allocated allowances
were adjusted.
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import price index and wage are all classified by NACE Revision 2, mainly on B and
C classification. Because of confidential issues, part of those data are unavailable
resulting in an unbalanced panel data.
Noticeably, those data are classified with different standards in defining industries.
An important work is to merge them with a uniform standard to generate complete
data. The currently available correspondence of NACE Revision 2 to SITC is far
away from complete, so I generate a correspondence of all different industries or
sector classification. They are listed in appendix.
Because of limitation of availability of FDI flows data, a gravity model cannot
apply to this study. The international trade flows are separated into EU 25- extra,
EU 25- intra, EU 15- extra and EU 15- intra to include into the linear regression.
The regression results are shown in table 12. From the table, I find that domestic
production price index increases inward FDI but decrease outward FDI. It is straight-
forward since investment moves to more profitable country. The higher the domestic
price, more investment from abroad. The wage index has negative relationship with
inward FDI and positive relationship with outward FDI. This result also follows in-
tuition and the theoretical model. Section I assumes that labor is immobile, thus
a higher wage rate in home country will decrease inward FDI and slightly increase
outward FDI to cheap labor countries.
The signs for trade flows are complicated. Both intra-EU imports and extra-EU
imports decrease inward FDI, thus they are substitutes. However, extra-EU exports
decrease outward FDI, while intra-EU exports increase outward FDI. One possible
reason for this is, since the EU is a custom union, that the higher the value of
intra-EU flows, the higher the productivity of the country is. For example, consider
Germany and the United Kingdom compared to other EU members. They are likely
to have more FDI flows in both directions than other EU countries. The production
volume index is negative for both inward and outward flows. It means when taking
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Table 12: Regression Results
EU-25 EU-15
FDI Inwards FDI Outward FDI Inward FDI Outward
EU-EXTRA log trade -240.236 -234.034 678.984 -436.975
(1236.69) (555.49) (2158.70) (997.93)
Regulation Dummy -2552.410 -1648.073 -2159.698 -603.929
(2441.34) (1250.05) (2862.69) (1638.37)
Production Index 4.022 5.532 -10.297 -19.726
(42.67) (13.33) (21.53) (22.41)
Wage Index -28.691 -19.583 -16.394 17.874
(54.89) (25.06) (40.74) (39.33)
Production Price Index 29.992 -100.701 29.568 -116.213
(112.99) (78.00) (114.70) (72.78)
EU-INTRA log trade -1105.656 -16.209 -1365.883 27.570
(1037.32) (643.60) (1481.08) (917.68)
R-sqr 0.595 0.795 0.585 0.837
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,*** p < 0.001
out countries’ characteristics by fixed effects, more domestic production decreases the
flows of FDI. Since higher domestic production is a substitute of inward flows, and for
domestic firms, it is profitable to produce within home country,rather than investing
abroad.
The regulation status of EU ETS is negative for both FDI inward and outward
flows. According to PHH, environmental regulation should increase FDI outwards
flows but decrease FDI inward flows, that is the relocation of firms to unregulated
countries. The empirical results I get are counter-intuitive here. From the model
in section IV, for national enterprises, the output of a firm in regulated country
is smaller than that for a firm with the same productivity but in an unregulated
country. But for two different firms under same regulation, their output depends on
their productivity. Moreover, a uniform distributed allowances under cap-and-trade
scheme may drive out efficient firms, thus, not only inward FDI flows decrease, the
decrease of endogenous numbers of HMNEs brings down outward FDI flows as well.
68
However, because of limitation and incomplete of data, none of those coefficients are
significant.
3.6 Conclusion and Future Study
This chapter builds an FDI and international trade model by taking emissions as
an input. It assumes endogenous entry and exit of firms so the firms could react
to a new environmental regulation, specially EU ETS. This complicated nonlinear
model implies that FDI flows depend on international trade flows, domestic price,
production, import price, wage and rent. It provides sights for improving further
traditional gravity model on studying of FDI flows. Moreover, heterogeneity in firm
productivity is introduced into the model to further explain firm behavior, especially
how the “cutoff” affects firm entry and exit. The results also highlight that the
way allowances are distributed matters for firms behavior. In section V, I use cross-
country cross-year unbalanced panel data to evaluate the impact of EU ETS on FDI
flows by controlling not only for country, industry and year fixed effects, but also to
include the relative industry level price index, such as wage, rent, import price and
domestic price. The coefficients for all prices support the theoretical model. Also,
international trade flows have different effects on FDI flows depending on whether
they are intra-EU flows or extra-EU flows. The result shows that EU ETS decreases
both inward and outward FDI flows. The decrease of FDI inward flows confirm PHH.
And the decreases of outward FDI flows follow the theoretical model that domestic
firms are driven out of the market.
Like other FDI or relocation study of PHH, this chapter does not find mathe-
matically significant results either. Further study should focus on data. Since FDI,
international trade flows, industrial level price indices and EU ETS regulations are
classifications with different standards, through merging all datasets will definitely
generate errors in sampling. Moreover, because of confidential issue, a large portion
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of FDI flows and price index data are missing, which results in an extreme imbalance
of panel data. Detailed industry level data for key variables are also lacking. Unlike
the first chapter of this thesis on international trade flows, which has complete data,
the data available for FDI flows is far from good. Firm level datasets could also solve
a part of the problem since it could capture more detail about firms’ reactions in
facing a new environmental regulation. However, firm level data could also be prob-
lematic because of randomness. Firm’s market power could also influence accurate































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































AGREEMENTS AFFECT MEMBER COUNTRIES’
BILATERAL TRADE FLOWS AFTER ADJUSTMENT OF
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND ENDOGENEITY
4.1 Introduction
In the past few decades many countries realized the importance of environmental
protection and sustainable development. Various environmental regulations have been
adopted in order to limit the emission of pollutants and to protect the environment.
As a result of increasing abatement cost for polluting industries, the pollution haven
effect states that stricter environmental regulations may drive production to countries
with less stringent environmental regulations. It is also known that lax environmental
regulation may increase comparative advantage in polluting industries.
Much research effort has been focused on examining the pollution haven effect,
both theoretically and empirically. Pethic (1976), Siebert (1977), McGuire (1982),
Markusen (1999), Ulph (1999), and Millimet and List (2004) showed environmental
regulations harm international trade. Walter (1982), Pearson (1985, 1987), Leonard
(1988), and Taylor (2005) showed stringent environmental regulations could also de-
crease foreign direct investment. The existing studies use various ways to measure
the stringency of environmental regulations. Ederington and Minier (2003) use envi-
ronmental abatement cost as the measurement of the stringiness of regulations and
treat it as endogenous in the U.S. from 1978 to 1992. Levinson and Taylor (2008)
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developed a theoretical model and test it empirically to examine the effect of envi-
ronmental regulations on trade flows between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, for 130
manufacturing industries from 1977 to 1986 with an instrument variable weighted by
state characteristics.
Yet none of these traditional approaches examine or take into account the surge of
voluntary multinational or international environmental agreements (MEA or IEA).
An MEA is considered to be a legally binding agreement among several countries
related to the environment. While environmental treaties date back to the end of the
19th century, the vast majority of MEAs have been adopted since the 1972 United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), often referred to as the
Stockholm Conference. Indeed, UNCHE was a watershed event that helped launch
the last 30 years of increasingly intensive treaty-making in the area of international
environmental law as well as much activity within national governments. Adopted
by all 113 countries present at the Stockholm Conference, the Stockholm Declaration
was the first universal document of importance on environmental matters. It placed
environmental issues squarely on the international scene. After 1972, the number
of MEAs has risen tremendously. Among others, because of the ratification of the
Montreal Protocol (1989), the number of MEA memberships has also increased.
Signing an MEA could eliminate the disadvantage in international competition
caused by unilaterally imposed more stringent environmental regulations. Egger
(2014) also shows that the numbers of MEAs are correlated with trade liberaliza-
tion. Moreover, voluntary participation in MEAs is similar to trade liberalization
realized by free trade agreements (FTA). When a country makes a decision whether
to engage in a multilateral trade or environmental agreements, it will compare costs
and benefits that depend not only on bilateral economic development, but also on
bilateral political issues. According to previous studies, we know that countries tend
to have an FTA if they are closer and similar in economy size. For environmental
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agreements, we can assume the same situations.
Over the past 40 years, the gravity equation has been the most widely used em-
pirical model to study the ex post effects of trade related policies such as FTAs and
customs unions on bilateral trade flows. The gravity equation is typically used to
explain cross-sectional variation in country pairs’ trade flows in term of countries’ in-
comes, bilateral distance, common language, common borders, and for the presence or
absences of an FTA [Trefler (1993), Anderson and Yotov (2009), Baier and Bergstrand
(2004), (2007), Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2013), Cheng and Wall (2005), Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003), Egger and Greenaway (2008)]. However, simply applying
dummy variables in a gravity equation to estimate the effects of MEAs or FTAs could
be problematic due to endogeneity, the voluntary participation on FTAs or MEAs.
Some econometric tool could deal with this problem such as using panel data with
fixed effects, using matching econometrics and Diff-in-diff (DID).
Several recent studies estimating the effects of MEAs on bilateral trade flows take
endogeneity into account. Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) investigate the Kyoto Pro-
tocol’s effects on international trade flows using matched pairs estimation dealing with
self-selection in Kyoto Commitments. Their regression includes all gravity variables
as well as FTAs with a DID model and shows a significant negative effect of Kyoto
Commitments on exports. Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) derive a gravity equation
for the carbon content of trade and suggests that Kyoto commitment on average leads
to increased imports in committed countries. However, most of their work focuses
on environment regulation stringency within a country or on a single multi-lateral
environmental agreements (Kyoto Protocol, Aichele and Felbermayr (2011), (2012),
(2013).
This chapter estimates the effects of MEAs on international trade flows using the
gravity equation and controlling for international trade agreements at the same time
as well. As mentioned above, if MEAs are endogeneous, cross-sectional empirical
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estimates of the effects of MEAs on trade flows would be biased. We follow Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) and estimate the effects of MEAs on imports by using a panel of
cross-section time-series data at five year intervals from 1965 to 2005 for 757 pairs of
trade partners (184 importer countries and 242 exporter countries).
This chapter is distinguished from other papers on environmental regulations in
several aspects. First, the basis of our MEA data is obtained from the International
Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database Project by Ronald B. Mitchell and the
IEA Database Project, 2002-2014. This truly systematic, comprehensive and up
to date list (i.e., the population) of MEAs include not only the agreements that
counter the pollution but also those that aim to preserve the ecology and species.
Our work is the first investigation on trade flows with comprehensive MEAs data
rather than national environmental regulation or single multinational environmental
agreement. Second, by applying the panel cross sectional time series data, we solve
the endogeneity of FTAs as well as MEAs. Furthermore, we separate the type of FTAs
to capture the effects of trade liberalization rather than stick with a single dummy. In
addition, we keep track of the total number of MEAs, MEAs with different subjects
adn those with the same lineage. This provides us more accurate estimation for the
effects of MEAs on international trade flows. We can further expand our results by
estimating the effect on international trade flows with numbers of MEAs broken by
different subjects that the agreement covers.
The empirical results in this chapter suggest several important conclusions. First,
we found MEAs have a significant negative effect on imports, while FTAs have a
significant positive effect. Those effects are consistent across various empirical speci-
fications (including year fixed effects, country fixed effects, reporter by partner fixed
effects, etc.). Traditional estimates of the MEAs on international trade flows by us-
ing cross-section gravity equation is biased. It overestimated the negative effect of
MEAs. The second important finding in this chapter is that the simultaneous absence
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of FTAs and MEAs increases the bilateral international trade a lot in magnitude and
significantly. This could be well explained by the self-selection of FTAs and MEAs.
The chapter is outlined as the following: Section 2 presents a traditional cross-
section gravity equation as well as our empirical model with panel regressions and
various fixed and time effects. In the section 3, the data used in this chapter are
introduced. Section 4 discusses the results and compares different results. We also
provide the possible explanations for potential bias. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Econometric Model





exp(β5(ADJij) exp(β6(FTAij)) exp(β7(IEAij))ϵij (2)
where Xij is the imports from country i to country j, or we call trade flows from
exporter j to importer i. GDP stands for the gross domestic product in both country,
importer and exporter. X(ij), GDPi andGDPj should be adjusted to 2005 price level.
DISTij, LANGij and ADJij are gravity variables, standing for the distance between
the economic centers of countries i and j, whether country i and country j share a
common language (value 1 is yes and 0 otherwise) and whether country i and country
j share a common land border (value 1 is yes and 0 otherwise).
In order to evaluate the effect of international environmental agreements accurate-
ly, we first take the free trade agreements into account. FTAij is a binary variable
assuming the value 1 if country i and j have a free trade agreement and 0 other-
wise. Similarly, IEAij is also a binary variable assumed to be 1 if country pair ij has
international environmental agreements between them.
The most general estimation method is to take log on both side of gravity equation,
which is also called cross-section gravity equation. The cross-section estimations try
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to find the average treatment effect which refers to the difference in trade flow between
a pair-country whether they have an FTA and/or IEA. In this chapter, we also apply
a cross-section model as one of our benchmarks. It is obvious that, if the choices
of FTA and/or IEA is correlated with some unobserved factors, i.e. the error term,
there will be some bias generated. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) claim that
ignoring pricing in the cross-section gravity equation results in bias. Suggested by
them, a computationally easier method to capture pricing terms is to use country
fixed effect. Considering the pricing factor not only changes cross countries but also
time, it seems that country fixed effect by year will lead to consistent estimations.
Even after taking pricing factor into account by using country fixed effect, we only
fix endogeneity caused by prices. There are numerous arguments addressed on how
the other unobserved heterogeneity in trade flow determinants affect FTA. One of the
most acceptable view is self-selection. Domestic policies on tariffs, competition and
antitrust rules, anti-dumping rules and environmental regulations may have a positive
relationship with the formation for FTAs since FTAs enhance trade liberalization
without relaxing domestic regulations.
Similar issues–self-selection of IEAs and the interactions between the FTAs and
IEAs– are more complicated. The self-selection into IEAs depends on economic size
and economic growth. Also, Rose and Spiegel (2009) claim that signing environmental
agreements positively affects cross asset holding. Egger et al. (2011) show that the
numbers of IEAs are also affected by the trade liberalization, i.e. FTAs.
Our main method is to estimate IEA treatment effects using panel data in this
work. We construct panel data from 1965 to 2005 of trade flows, bilateral trade
agreements and international environmental agreements as well as gravity covariates.
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exp(β5ADJij) exp(β6FTAijt) exp(β7IEAijt)ϵijt (3)
After taking log on both side of the equation, we have:
lnXijt = β0 + β1 ln(GDPit) + β2 ln(GDPjt) + β3 ln(DISTij) + β4Langij
+ β5(ADJ)ij + β6(FTAijt) + β7(IEAijt) + ϵijt (4)
We provide several different estimations, an estimation with the model above with-
out bilateral fixed effects or time dummies as our benchmark for panel regression, then
we add time dummies only to our models. In order to adjust for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity, we add country-pair fixed dummies as well. As mentioned
above, the numbers of IEAs are affected by countries’ trade liberalizations. Based
on the type of FTAs (Type I stands for partial liberalization, i.e. one-way and two-
way preferential trade agreements. Type II is FTAs and Type III includes customs
union, common market, and economic union.), we generate interactions for FTAs and
IEAs. Based on the previous experience studies and observations, we could expect
FTAs will increase international trade flows. While the effects of MEAs should be
negative based on pollution haven hypothesis. This discussion is very straight for-
ward, for instance, two countries have agreements on marine species protection, trade
flows within them on fishery should decrease. Similarly, if they engage in pollution
regulations(agreements), bilateral trade flows between them on dirty products will
reduce as a result of increase in abatement cost due to the stringent environmental
regulation.
4.3 Data
The data we used consist of four parts: bilateral trade flows, free trade agreements,
gravity variables, and multi-lateral environmental agreements.
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The trade flow data are an aggregation of trade flows from the UN Comtrade
database, using the 5-digit SITC revision 1 data as the starting point as it provides
the longest possible time series. In this chapter, we use five-year window data from
1965 to 2005 for all potential trade partners (zero trade flows are excluded). The
reason that we use every five-year data instead of annually data is that the policies,
such as FTAs and IEAs do not change that frequently (Anderson and Yotov (2012)
working paper). It will provide us a clearer result of how the environmental policies
and trade agreements affect international trade. All trade flow data are scaled by
GDP deflators to generate real trade flows.
As for the economic determinants of MEA and FTA membership, we include
the GDP as a measure of a country’s economic mass. Nominal GDPs are from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2005) and scaled by the GDP deflator
(2005) as well. Variables required for gravity equation such as geographical distance,
adjacency, or common language are from a data set made publicly available by CEPII.
The trade agreement data are obtained from Baier and Bergstrand (2007) who
compiled and maintain the Economic Integration Agreements Database. They clas-
sified integration agreements following Lawrence (1996) and Frankel (1997). The
original data resource is at www.nd.edu/ jbergstr. In Baier, Bergstrand, and Mariut-
to (2014) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) when the presences of FTAs are examined,
only the full FTAs and customs unions are included. But in our work, all types of
free trade agreements are considered.
MEA data are obtained from International Environmental Agreements (IEA)
Database Project. They include multilateral and bilateral environmental agreements
since 1857. All the agreements are recorded with signature date, agreement titles,
membership, and agreement type by topic covered, lineage and sequences. We cre-
ate a dummy variable for each active environmental agreements between each pair
of countries according to the membership and year. We also create a count for
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each pair of countries by year to record the number of MEAs the pair shares. The
counts for each subject are also generated to evaluate international trade flows by
the different type (agreements1, amendments2, other modification3 and protocol4) or
subject(energy, freshwater resources, habitat, ocean, pollution, species and weapons
and environment) of an MEA. All the counts can be adjusted by their lineages, as
some agreements are updated and amended over time in order to avoid duplication of
counts. In this chapter we mainly focus on the presences of MEAs by using an MEA
dummy to indicate a country pair shares an agreement.
Table 14 listed the summary of statistics. There are total 94,808 observations
with 29053 pairs of trade partners. Since the time period we chose to cover is from
1965-2005 every five years, we have unbalanced panel data. 17,053 observations have
the IEA value equal to 0, while there are as many as 382 multi-lateral environmental
agreements/protocol between France and Germany. United States have 240 MEAs
with United Kingdom at 2005. Table 16 shows the percentile of the numbers of
environmental agreements. Our data show the same results as in Egger et al (2011)
that countries in Europe engaged in more MEAs than Africa or Asia countries. Figure
6 illustrates the numbers of MEAs within U.S and its major trade partner countries:
Canada, Mexico, Germany, Unite Kingdom, China and Japan. We could observe a
booming of the numbers of environmental agreements after 1980s. Similarly, Figure 7
shows the numbers of MEAs within China and several major trade partners including
Canada, Mexico, India, Japan, United Kingdom and Germany.
1“Agreement” includes Accord, Act-Agreement, Act-Commission, Act-Treaty, Acuerdo, Adjust-
ment, Agreement, Arrangement-Agreement, Articles of Association, Charter-Agreement, Constitu-
tion, Convencion, Convenio, Convention, Convenzione, Covenant, Exchange of Letters Constituting
An Agreement, Exchange of Notes Constituting An Agreement, Grant Agreement, Instrument,
Interim Agreement, Interim Arrangement, Interim Convention, Loan Agreement, Provisional Un-
derstanding, Statute, Statute-Commission, Supplementary Treaty, Tratado, Treaty.
2Amendment Agreement-Amendment; Amendment; Arrangement-Amendment; Extension
3“Other Modification” include Denunciation; Exchange of Letters Modifying an Agreement; Ex-
change of Notes Modifying an Agreement; Proces-Verbal
4Optional Protocol, Protocol, Protocole, Protocolo, Supplemental Agreement, Supplementary
Agreement, Supplementary Arrangement, Supplementary Protocol
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Table 14: Summary Statistics
Variable No. of Obser. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 94,808 1,990.202 12.61805 1965 2005
Imports Flows 94,808 1.34E+08 1.39E+09 1 1.73E+11
No. of MEAs 94,808 34.86733 47.69225 0 382
No. of FTAs 81,730 0.4769 1.046069 0 6
Table 15: Types of FTAs
Type of trade agreements Freqency Percent Cum.
0 61,392 75.12 75.12
1 11,597 14.19 89.31
2 2,896 3.54 92.85
3 3,378 4.13 96.98
4 1,227 1.5 98.48
5 894 1.09 99.58
6 346 0.42 100
Total 81,730 100
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Figure 6: Numbers of MEAs within U.S and Tts Major Trade Partner
In this chapter, we focus more on taking dummy for MEAs as we are looking for
the effects of presence of MEAs. But we also do some analysis on the numbers of
environmental agreements. Noticeably, any consideration of the numbers of MEAs
should be very careful since the weights or the effects of an agreement or a protocol
with different subjects fluctuate.
According to Scott and Bergstrand (2007)’s data for trade agreements, our data
has 13078 missing value, 61,309 with none trade agreements in any form among them.
Type 1 and 2 stands for one-way and two-way preferential trade agreements (where
preferential denotes only partial liberalization, not free trade). Type 3, Type 4, Type
5 and Type 6 stand for FTAs, customs union, common market, or economic union.
The decomposition is provided in table 15.
87
Figure 7: Numbers of MEAs within China and Its Major Trade Partner
4.4 Results
4.4.1 FTAs dummy and IEAs dummy
We start our regression with cross-section OLS in table 17, which is also our bench-
mark. The first column follows the gravity equation that evaluates the effects of
FTAs. In this stage, we stick to FTA dummy, that if there existing any trade agree-
ments, it equals 1, otherwise it is 0. The result shows FTA will significantly increase
Table 16: Number of MEAs by percentile
Number of Environmental Agreements Freqency Percent Cum.
0 17053 17.99 17.99
1–5 18951 19.98 37.98
6–15 14194 14.98 52.95
16-50 21215 22.37 75.32
51–100 14115 14.91 90.21
100–200 8280 8.78 98.95
200+ 980 0.92 100
Total 94808 100
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bilateral trade by 64.9% for country-pair. In the column 2, we apply the same model
but with IEA dummy only. As expected, we find that IEAs decrease bilateral trade
by 1.096 log point. This result is also significant at 95% level. We take both IEA
and FTA into account in column 3, which gives us a similar result, the FTA effect is





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In order to further understand the interaction between IEA and FTA, we use two
different ways. We generate dummy IEAonly if the bilateral countries only have envi-
ronmental agreements between them but no trade agreements. The dummy EIAonly
is 1 if the bilateral countries only have trade agreements but no environmental agree-
ments. If both agreements exist between importer and exporter, then the interaction
of FTA and IEA will be 1. Results are listed in the column 4. Because of colin-
earity, the coefficient for interaction of FTA and IEA is omitted. The result implies
that country-pairs with only trade agreements but no environmental agreements have
0.059 log points less trade flows than the country-pairs with both, also country-pairs
with only environmental agreements but no trade agreements have 81.9 log points
less trade flows than the country-pairs with both. EIAonly dummy is not significant
while IEAonly dummy is significant at 95% level.
This result presents a very interesting phenomenon. Assuming that environmental
agreements are irrelevant to free trade agreements, the presences of FTAs will increase
bilateral trade while the presence of MEAs decrease bilateral trade flow as we dis-
cussed in section 2, we would expect that country-pair with only trade agreements
should have largest amount of trade flows (partial out other effects that influence
trade),followed by the country-pairs with environmental agreements and trade agree-
ments. Country-pairs with only environmental agreements but no trade agreements
should have smallest scale of international trade. However our results show that
country-pairs with both agreements should have larger trade flows than have only
one kind of agreements or nothing. It provides us an evidence that, countries with
more trade flows may be more likely to sign agreements with each other. This is quite
reasonable if we imagine two countries with large bilateral trade flows and free trade
agreements, to avoid being the “pollution haven” of the other and to protect the
comparative advantages, the social welfare would increase if both sign environmental
agreements.
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The second way to capture the interaction between trade agreements and envi-
ronmental agreements is to keep the original dummy variables for trade and envi-
ronmental agreements, then add the interaction of them. Results are presented in
column 5. It suggests the same result in column 4. Country-pairs with both two
kinds of agreements have the largest volume of trade. All the OLS results are very
consistent, however, OLS results could be problematic due to the endogeneity caused
by the pricing and self-selection that we discussed above.
In table 17 we also list the same regression results for FTA, IEA and both with
year dummies in column (5)-(10). The magnitude of coefficients for FTAs and IEAs
decrease. In the current stage, we consider only the average treatment effect of signing
IEA with unobservable variables changing in every five years. After we taking out
the year fixed effect, the FTA effects decrease from 64.9% to 61.1%, while IEAs
effects change from 109.6% to 74.4%. Without interaction of FTAs and IEAs, IEAs
decrease international trade more than it is increased by trade agreements. After
adding the interaction terms (the two ways described above), having FTAs and IEAs
simultaneously increases international trade the most. The year fixed effect model























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To capture the unobservable variables that affect countries choices on FTAs and
IEAs as well as prices, we added the countries fixed effect in table 18, column (1) –
(5). The results are similar with OLS regression except the magnitude getting smaller.
The FTAs increases international trade by 0.464 and IEAs decrease trade flows by
0.309. However, after including interaction terms for both agreements, the presence of
both trade agreements and environmental agreements reduces trade flows. In column
4, the EIAonly is omitted due to the colinearity. FTAs within bilateral countries
increase trade volume the most by 0.464. Having both kinds of agreements increase
international trade by 0.161. IEAs decreases trade volume by 0.327. These changes
show the inconsistency of the OLS regressions. Then we regress year dummies and
country dummies simultaneously, results are reported in table 5 column (6) – (10).
4.4.2 Panel Regressions: Fixed effects model
Then we move to panel regressions. We applied both fixed effects and random ef-
fects. Results are reported in table 19 and table 20 correspondingly. Columns (1) to
columns (5) include no year fixed effects while (6) to (10) have year fixed effects in
regression as we did above. According to the discussion above, the fixed effects model
is more proper than the random effects model. The reason is that endogeneity bias
except the pricing terms is unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. For example, the
social benefits interaction, political issues and competitions between the importer and
exporter may simultaneously influence the presence of FTA, IEA and the volume of
trade. Random effects model assuming that unobservable terms are irrelevant to the
choices of FTA or IEA, which is less plausible. Moreover, Egger (2000) shows that
using bilateral-pair or country specific fixed effect in gravity model is more reasonable
than random effects model. Our results imply that a random effects model generates
quite similar results as OLS regression. This method may not adjust endogeneity
bias sufficiently. Within the panel regression, we also add year dummy to adjust
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the pricing change over years. The random effects model suggests the incremental

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Our fixed effect panel regression verifies that ignoring the endogeneity of bilateral
countries characteristics overestimate the effects of FTAs and IEAs. By applying
fixed effect panel regression, the positive effects of FTAs is 0.07 while the negative
effects EIAs is 0.526. After adding year dummies, the coefficient of FTA is 0.11 and
the coefficient for IEA dummy is -0.536. The adjustment of endogeneity provides
us a convincing result that isolate the effects of trade agreements and environmental
agreements. Comparing the situation with trade agreements only, having EIAs and
FTAs simultaneously decrease international trade by 0.314, with only EIAs decreases
trade volume by 0.487.
The last method that we are using to address the endogeneity is to add importer
by year and exporter by year fixed effect with panel regressions. Results are listed
in table 21. We still have significant and positive result for FTAs at 16%. The neg-
ative effect of EIAs is 16% but insignificant under each cases. The gravity variables
are insignificant either since taking too many kinds of fixed effects. For example,
importer by year and exporter by year fixed effects capture the real GDP of the im-
porter and exporter. The bilateral country fixed effects capture the distances and
other unobservable characteristics between trade partners. Thus, this result is less
convincing than the panel regression with only bilateral countries fixed effects. From
the summary statistics, we notice that some bilateral countries have been keeping
some environmental agreements among them for decades. But the numbers of them
increased sharply in 1980s. In order to further specify the effects of environmental
agreements on international trade flows, we use log value of the numbers of envi-
ronmental agreements to examine the influences by panel regressions with year fixed
effects model. Results are reported in table 22. We also find significant negative
effects of environmental agreements. The number of MEA increases by 1% will de-
crease bilateral trade flows by 7.5%. The FTA effects decreases to 10% comparing
to previous results. One possible explanation is the multi-colinearity of FTA and
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Table 21: Country by Year Fixed Effects Results
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
FTA dummy 0.147*** 0.147*** -0.060
(0.03) (0.03) (0.10)




MEA FTA both 0.146***
(0.03)
MEA by FTA 0.215*
(0.10)
Country Fixed Effects No No No No No
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No
Country by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.610
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
numbers of environmental agreements.
4.4.3 Categorization of different trade agreements
As described above, we could separate our trade agreements into four categories: trade
agreements that include both partial trade agreements and free trade agreements,
customs union, common market and economic union. We conduct same regressions
with and without interactions of IEAs and FTAs as before. Table 23 applies OLS
regression with and without year and country fixed effects. Column 1 stands for the
OLS regression only for FTAs. Then we include them simultaneously in column 2 and
add interactions terms in column 3. Column (4)-(6) follow the same pattern but year
effects are included. Column (6) to (8) contain both year and country fixed effects.
Table 24 presents panel fixed effect regressions with and without year fixed effects. We
can still observe the severe bias of OLS regressions, even after adjustment with year
or countries are applied. We find that customs union increases bilateral international
trade the most comparing to trade agreements, common market and economic union.
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Table 22: Numbers of MEAs results
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Ln GDP reporter 0.885*** 0.908*** 0.911*** 0.911*** 0.911***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln GDP partner 0.680*** 0.767*** 0.764*** 0.764*** 0.764***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FTA dummy 0.136*** 0.098*** 0.098***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log numbers of MEA -0.077*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.075***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MEA only -0.098***
(0.03)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sqr 0.528 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.530
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,***p < 0.001
Custom unions are likely to increase bilateral trade volume by 0.665, of which the
coefficient for common market is 0.404 and 0.419 for economic union. The effects of
EIAs are negative and significant except in column 6. After taking bilateral country
fixed effects, importer by year and exporter by year fixed effects, almost all variables
are insignificant. The coefficient for IEAs dummy is 0.540 and significant at 99% level.
This result is quite close to FTA dummy only case since the categorization of trade
agreements should have no effects on the coefficient of IEAs. Table 25 lists the results
for the numbers of environmental agreements. The negative effects of environmental
agreements do not change comparing to the previous parts. 1% increase in numbers















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.5 Conclusion and Future Study
This work attempts to answer the question that whether bilateral/multilateral en-
vironmental agreements decreasing international trade flow. Same as evaluating the
effects of free trade agreements, estimating the effects of environmental agreements
with gravity equation suffer from the bias caused by the endogeneity due to un-
observed heterogeneity. We applied various methods, from standard cross-section
gravity models with or without adding fixed effects, to fixed effect panel regressions.
Our results imply that environmental agreements decrease bilateral trade by 55%
to 70%. And this number is much smaller than OLS regression, which means the
cross-sectional gravity model overestimates the negative effects of environmental a-
greements. The bias of OLS regression suggests there is a self-selection bias from
engaging in environmental agreements. Countries are more likely to have multilateral
environmental agreements when they expect smaller effects on international trade,
or comparative advantage. Also, we further study the different types of free trade
agreements and their interactions with environmental agreements.
There is much more work to be done in the future. In this chapter we put more
weight on considering the presence of environmental agreements rather than the num-
ber of them. By using the number of IEAs as independent variables we could obtain
more detailed results. Moreover, the types, subjects, coverage, and lineage of environ-
mental agreements may have different effects on international trade. A single dummy
variable standing for EIAs provides us with a limited capacity to examine the effects.
For instance, agreements on pollution of air and oceans may have larger effect on
bilateral trade in energy intensive sectors, while agreements on species and habitats
have relatively smaller effects on international competitiveness. Highly aggregate da-
ta on either trade volume or numbers of environmental agreements provides limited
results.
Additionally, the lineage of environmental agreements may bias the results. The
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Table 25: The Effects of Log Number of MEAs: Panel Regressions with Fixed Effects
Variable 1 2 3 4
Ln GDP Reporter 0.908*** 0.884*** 0.910*** 0.910***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln GDP Partner 0.767*** 0.680*** 0.761*** 0.761***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log numbers of MEA -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.076***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FTA Type=0 0.085 1.123*** 1.123***
(0.11) (0.20) (0.20)
FTA Type=1,2,3 0.230* 1.248***
(0.11) (0.20)
FTA Type=4 0.503*** 1.505***
(0.14) (0.22)
FTA Type=5 0.163 1.105***
(0.13) (0.21)
FTA Type=6 0.221 1.147***
(0.16) (0.23)
Type 1,2,3 by MEA 1.248***
(0.20)
Type 4 by MEA 1.505***
(0.22)
Type 5 by MEA 1.105***
(0.21)
Type 6 by MEA 1.147***
(0.23)
R-sqr 0.530 0.529 0.531 0.531
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,***p < 0.001
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upgrade or amendment of existing agreements may or may not affect firms’ behavior,
hence the influences on international trade are quite unclear. Moreover, we consider
only the volume of trade but ignore the extensive or intensive margins. It is plausible
that environmental agreements create some trade and terminate other trade. This
topic has political significance in evaluating social welfare rather than the volume of
trade. A lot of research focuses on how trade liberalization changes the environment;
hence, another way to use this data is to study how the trade flows and FTAs change
the numbers of environmental agreements.
Nevertheless, our work provides a result of the average treatment effect of envi-
ronmental agreements on trade, isolating the effects FTAs and adjusting for possible




This thesis studies the interaction between environmental agreements and interna-
tional bilateral trade motivated by the pollution haven hypothesis. The pollution
havens hypothesis states that stringent environmental policies may drive the dirty
industries to the countries with less stringent regulations. My thesis verifies the pol-
lution haven hypothesis from three different aspects, international trade and foreign
direct investment changes caused by the European Union Emission Trading Scheme
and the general effects of all types environmental agreements on country level bilateral
trade flows.
In the second chapter, I use the cross-section, cross-time bilateral trade flow data
to evaluate the EU Emission Trading Scheme effect on international trade with a
gravity model based on the pollution haven hypothesis. I find that EU ETS increases
imports and decreases exports. Separate regressions imply that the pollution haven
is generated with respect to the middle income and upper middle income countries,
which is consistent with Environmental Kuznets Curve as well. The member countries
which are in the (net) short position do face a deterioration of their comparative
advantage. The effect of auctions is not significant due to the small portion of the
total allowances. Those results suggest that there is a pollution haven effect caused
by EU ETS among EU countries. However, there is no significant evidence on how
auctions of allowances affected bilateral flows.
My results suggest that further tightening of the emission cap or increases in
the compliance cost to producers (auctioned) could disadvantage regulated countries
when it comes to international competition. Pollution haven was generated by EU
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ETS, particularly for industries short in allowances. Considering that greenhouse gas
is a global pollutant, further sacrificing EU economic benefits may not be an optimal
choice. For some industries, such as iron and steel, the total effect of EU ETS is to
increase their comparative advantage. Thus, in order to achieve emission goals in the
third phase, their allocated allowances could be cut, or auctioned. Also, according to
my results, the trade pattern is controllable by varying the freely allocated allowances.
But, the effect of auction on international trade is still unclear.
The second chapter builds an FDI and international trade model by taking e-
missions as an input. It assumes endogenous entry and exit of firms so the firms
could react to a new environmental regulation, specifically the EU ETS. This com-
plicated nonlinear model implies that FDI flows depend on international trade flows,
domestic price, production, import price, wage and rent. It provides insights for im-
proving further traditional gravity model on studying of FDI flows. Moreover, firm
heterogeneity is introduced into the model to further explain firm behavior, especially
with respect to the firm entry and exit productivity “cutoff” point. The results also
highlight that the way allowances are distributed matters for firm behavior. I use
cross-country cross-year unbalanced panel data to evaluate the impact of EU ETS on
FDI flows by controlling not only for country, industry and year fixed effects, but also
including the relative industry level price index, such as wage, rent, import price and
domestic price. The coefficients for all prices support the theoretical model. Also,
international trade flows have different effects on FDI flows depending on whether
they are intra-EU flows or extra-EU flows. The result shows that EU ETS decreas-
es both inward and outward FDI flows. The decrease of FDI inward flows confirm
the pollution haven hypothesis. And the decreases of outward FDI flows follow the
theoretical model that domestic firms are driven out of the market.
Chapter IV attempts to answer the question that whether multilateral environ-
mental agreements decrease international trade. Same as evaluating the effects of
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free trade agreements, estimating the effects of environmental agreements with grav-
ity equation suffer from the bias caused by the endogeneity due to unobserved het-
erogeneity. We applied various methods, from standard cross-section gravity models
with or without adding fixed effects, to fixed effect panel regressions. Our results
imply that environmental agreements decrease bilateral trade by 55% to 70%. And
this number is much smaller than OLS regression, which means the cross-sectional
gravity model overestimates the negative effects of environmental agreements. The
bias of OLS regression suggests there is a self-selection bias from engaging in envi-
ronmental agreements. Countries are more likely to have multilateral environmental
agreements when they expect smaller effects on international trade, or comparative
advantage. Also, we further study the different types of free trade agreements and
their interactions with environmental agreements.
Future work should focus on data modifications. Like other FDI or relocation
studies of the pollution havens hypothesis, my work does not find mathematically
significant results either. Firm level datasets could also solve a part of the problem s-
ince it could capture more detail about firms’ reactions in facing a new environmental
regulation. However, firm level data could also be problematic because of random-
ness. Firm’s market power could also influence accurate evaluation of environmental
regulations. Or other disaggregated data could be helpful. If we can further separate
FDI flows into intra-EU FDI flows and extra-EU FDI flows, it could provide us more
results about how EU ETS shifts investment.
With our current datasets, there is also much more work to be done in the fu-
ture. In chapter IV we put more weight on considering the presence of environmental
agreements rather than the number of them. By using the number of multilateral
environmental agreements as the independent variable we could obtain more detailed
results. Moreover, the types, subjects, coverage, and lineage of environmental agree-
ments may have different effects on international trade. A single dummy variable
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identifying the existence of trade agreements provides us with a limited capacity to
examine their effects. For instance, agreements on pollution of air and oceans may
have larger effects on bilateral trade in energy intensive sectors, while agreements
on species and habitats may have relatively smaller effects on international competi-
tiveness. Highly aggregate data on either trade volume or numbers of environmental
agreements provides limited results.
Additionally, the lineage of environmental agreements may bias the results. The
upgrade or amendment of existing agreements may or may not affect firms’ behavior,
hence the effect on international trade are potentially not as clear as one would
like. Moreover, we consider only the volume of trade but ignore the extensive or
intensive margins. It is plausible that environmental agreements create some trade
and terminate other trade. This topic has political significance in evaluating social
welfare rather than the volume of trade. A lot of research focuses on how trade
liberalization changes the environment; hence, another way to use this data is to study
how the trade flows and FTAs change the numbers of environmental agreements.
We can also widen our work by going to more detailed studies on international
trade flows. For example, we can study how the extensive margin and intensive mar-
gin change before and after an environmental policy launched. Environmental policy
may generate bilateral trade for some eco-friendly industries, hybrid automobiles and
manufacturing devices, while impeding trade for “dirty” goods. Hence, by examin-
ing how extensive margin and intensive margin change could provide us with more





CES: Constant Elasticity of Substitution
CITL: Community International Transaction Log
EEA: European Environmental Agency
EU: European Union
EU: ETS European Union Emission Trading Scheme
EUA: European Union allowances
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
FE: Fixed Effect
FTA: Free Trade Agreements
GDP: Gross Domestic Production
HMNE: Horizontal Multinational Enterprises
HOV model: Hecksher-Ohilin-Vanek model
IEA: International Environmental Agreements
MEA: Multilateral Environmental Agreements
NAP: National Allocation Plan
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PHH: Pollution Haven Hypothesis
SITC: Standard International Trade Classification
TRI: Toxic Release Inventory
UNCHE: United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
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